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My Ridiculously Specific Expectation for 10-year Interest Rates

I try to stay away from making predictions. I don’t see the upside. If I am right, then yay! But after the fact, predictions often look obvious (hindsight bias) and it is hard to get much credit for them. By the same token, if I am wrong then the ex post facto viewer shakes his head sadly at my obtuseness. Sure, I can make a prediction with a very high likelihood of being true – I predict that the team name of the 2019 Super Bowl winner will end in ‘s’ – but there’s no point in that. This is one of the reasons I think analysts should in general shy away from making correct predictions and instead focus on asking the correct questions.

But on occasion, I feel chippy and want to make predictions. So now I am going to make a ridiculously specific prediction. This prediction is certain to be incorrect; therefore, I just want to observe that it would be churlish of you to criticize me for its inaccuracy either before or after the fact.

Ten-year Treasury rates will break through 3% for good on May 10, and proceed over the next six weeks to 3.53%. As of this Thursday, year/year core CPI inflation is going to be 2.2% or 2.3%, and median CPI over 2.5% and nearing 9-year highs. At that level of current inflation, 3% nominal yields simply make no sense, especially with the economy – for now – growing above trend. Two percent growth with 2.5% inflation is 4.5%, isn’t it? There is also no reason for 10-year real yields to be below 1%, so when we get to that 3.53% target it will be 1.08% real and 2.45% expected inflation (breakevens).

As I said, inflation is going up, at least through the summer (and I think quite a bit beyond), and summer is traditionally a difficult time for the bond market (although less so in recent years). So I think the selloff will end by June 28th and we will chop around in a 16bp range – roughly the average range from the last two chop periods – until September 6th. Then we will have a nice little rally to 3.18% as economic reports start to show some softness and the Q3 GDP trackers start to point to a 1-handle report. Also, Democrats will continue to lead in the generic ballot polling, prompting fears that impeachment proceedings for the President will begin once the party takes Congress in the midterm elections. Stocks will do badly for the second half of the year, partly on growth concerns, partly on interest rate concerns and the inflation outlook, and partly on fear that impeachment could damage the Trump business-friendly environment. But stocks will not do so badly so quickly as to trigger a flight-to-quality flow into bonds. Price deterioration will be steady with the S&P 500 dropping to 2329 by November 6th, when 10-year yields will be at 3.23%.

On Election Day, returns will show that voters booted out a lot of Republicans, but a surprising number of old guard Democrats also lose their seats. The House flips to the Democrats, while Republicans retain a slim edge in the Senate. The Democrats surprise everyone by not selecting Nancy Pelosi to be the Speaker of the House, signaling that they have no desire to pursue impeachment against a President whose leadership and behavior they question but against whom no actual crime is alleged. (Moreover, Democrats realize that they would rather contest for the White House in 2020 against The Donald than against some other, less lampoonable Republican). Stocks rally into year-end, but bonds begin the next leg down. By early 2019, although the economy is recording its first quarter of the as-yet-unidentified recession, the Fed continues to tighten, core inflation exceeds 3%, 10-year bonds surpass 4.25%, and stocks resume a downtrend that lasts for much of that year and takes the S&P 500 to 1908.75. The curve never inverts as the Fed keeps chasing inflation higher.

Now, if I nail even 20% of that prediction you’ll be justifiably impressed. But the point of the exercise is less about laying markers on particular outcomes and more about imagining how the bond bear market – because that is what I believe we are now in – will unfold. While I don’t know if my conjecture about how the election and the run-up thereto will hold, I do think it is likely that the midterms will cause more than the usual amount of market turbulence. And this is in the context of markets that have already rediscovered their turbulence somewhat. Now, I may also be completely wrong about inflation, but the number of signposts we are seeing these days about capacity constraints in labor markets and some product markets (and even some commodity markets) indicate to me that this inflation scare is less jump-scare and more Gothic horror novel.

We will turn the next page on that novel this Thursday when the CPI is reported. To ‘listen’ to me read a few pages about inflation, be sure to sign up for my private Twitter feed at https://premosocial.com/inflation_guypv and follow my CPI tweets live (I am also starting to put more chart packages and other content on that feed, so sign up! Only $10 per month!)

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Why the M2 Slowdown Doesn’t Blunt My Inflation Concern

April 12, 2018 1 comment

We are now all good and focused on the fact that inflation is headed higher. As I’ve pointed out before, part of this is an illusion of motion caused by base effects: not just cell phones, but various other effects that caused measured inflation in the US to appear lower than the underlying trend because large moves in small components moved the average lower even while almost half of the consumption basket continues to inflate by around 3% (see chart, source BLS, Enduring Investments calculations).

But part of it is real – better central-tendency measures such as Median CPI are near post-crisis highs and will almost certainly reach new highs in the next few months. And as I have also pointed out recently, inflation is moving higher around the world. This should not be surprising – if central banks can create unlimited amounts of money and push securities prices arbitrarily higher without any adverse consequence, why would we ever want them to do anything else? But just as the surplus of sand relative to diamonds makes the former relatively less valuable, adding to the float of money should make money less valuable. There is a consequence to this alchemy, although we won’t know the exact toll until the system has gone back to its original state.

(I think this last point is underappreciated. You can’t measure an engine’s efficiency by just looking at the positive stroke. It’s what happens over a full cycle that tells you how efficient the engine is.)

I expect inflation to continue to rise. But because I want to be fair to those who disagree, let me address a potential fly in the inflationary ointment: the deceleration in the money supply over the last year or so (see chart, source Federal Reserve).

Part of my thesis for some time has been that when the Fed decided to raise interest rates without restricting reserves, they played a very dangerous game. That’s because raising interest rates causes money velocity to rise, which enhances inflation. Historically, when the Fed began tightening they restrained reserves, which caused interest rates to rise; the latter effect caused inflation to rise as velocity adjusted but over time the restraint of reserves would cause money supply growth (and then inflation) to fall, and the latter effect predominated in the medium-term. Ergo, decreasing the growth rate of reserves tended to cause inflation to decline – not because interest rates went up, which actually worked against the policy, but because the slow rate of growth of money eventually compounded into a larger effect.

And so my concern was that if the Fed moved rates higher but didn’t do it by restraining the growth rate of reserves, inflation might just get the bad half of the traditional policy result. The reason the Fed is targeting interest rates, rather than reserves, is that they have no power over reserves right now (or, at best, only a very coarse power). The Fed can only drain the inert excess reserves, which don’t affect money supply growth directly. The central bank is not operating on the margin and so has lost control of the margin.

But sometimes they get lucky, and they may just be getting lucky. Commercial bank credit growth (see chart, source Federal Reserve) has been declining for a while, pointing to the reason that money supply growth is slowing. It isn’t the supply of credit, which is unconstrained by reserves and (at least for now) unconstrained by balance sheet strength. It’s the demand for credit, evidently.

Now that I’ve properly laid out that M2 is slowing, and that declining M2 growth is typically associated with declining inflation (and I haven’t even yet pointed out that Japanese and EU M2 growth are both also at the lowest levels since 2014), let me say that this could be good news for inflation if it is sustained. But the problem is that since the slowing of M2 is not the result of a conscious policy, it’s hard to predict that money growth will stay slow.

The reason it needs to be sustained is that we care about percentage changes in the stock of money plus the percentage change in money velocity. For years, the latter term has been a negative number as money velocity declined with interest rates. But M2 velocity rose in the fourth quarter, and my back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests it probably rose in Q1 as well and will rise again in Q2 (we won’t know Q1’s velocity until the advance GDP figures are reported later this month). If interest rates normalize, then it implies a movement higher in velocity to ‘normal’ levels represents a rise of about 12-14% from here (see chart, source Bloomberg.[1])

If money velocity kicks in 12-14% over some period to the “MVºPQ” relationship, then you need to have a lot of growth, or a pretty sustained decline in money growth, to offset it. The following table is taken from the calculator on our website and you can play with your own assumptions. Here I have assumed the economy grows at 2.5% per year for the next four years (no mean feat at the end of a long expansion).

The way to read this chart is to say “what if velocity over the next four years returns to X. Then what money growth is associated with what level of inflation?” So, if you go down the “1.63” column, indicating that at the end of four years velocity has returned to the lower end of its long-term historical range, and read across the M2 growth rate row labeled “4%”, you come to “4.8%,” which means that if velocity rises to 1.63 over the next four years, and growth is reasonably strong, and money growth remains as slow as 4%, inflation will average 4.8% per year over those four years.

So, even if money growth stays at 4% for four years, it’s pretty easy to get inflation unless money velocity also stays low. And how likely is 4% money growth for four years? The chart below shows 4-year compounded M2 growth rates back thirty or so years. Four percent hasn’t happened in a very long time.

Okay, so what if velocity doesn’t bounce? If we enter another bad recession, then it’s conceivable that interest rates could go back down and keep M2 velocity near this level. This implies flooding a lot more liquidity into the economy, but let’s suppose that money growth is still only 4% because of tepid credit demand growth and velocity stays low because interest rates don’t return to normal. Then what happens? Well, in this scenario presumably we’re no longer looking at 2.5% annual growth. Here’s rolling-four-year GDP going back a ways (source: BEA).

Well, let’s say that it isn’t as bad as the Great Recession, and that real growth only slows a bit in fact. If we get GDP growth of 1.5% over four years, velocity stays at 1.43, and M2 grows only at 4%, then:

…you are still looking at 2.5% inflation in that case.

I’m going through these motions because it’s useful to understand how remarkable the period we’ve recently been through actually is in terms of the growth/inflation tradeoff, and how unlikely to be repeated. The only reason we have been able to have reasonable growth with low inflation in the context of money growth where it has been is because of the inexorable decline in money velocity which is very unlikely to be repeated. If velocity just stops going down, you might not have high inflation numbers but you’re unlikely to get very low inflation outcomes. And if velocity rises even a little bit, it’s very hard to come up with happy outcomes that don’t involve higher inflation.

I admit that I am somewhat surprised that money growth has slowed the way it has. It may be just a coin flip, or maybe credit demand is displaying some ‘money illusion’ and responding to higher nominal rates even though real rates have not changed much. But even then…in the last tightening cycle, the Fed hiked rates from 1% to 5.25% over two years in 2004-2006, and money growth still averaged 5% over the four years ended in 2006. While I’m surprised at the slowdown in money growth, it needs to stay very slow for quite a while in order to make a difference at this point. It’s not the way I’d choose to bet.


[1] N.b. Bloomberg’s calculation for M2 velocity does not quite match the calculation of the St. Louis Fed, which is presumably the correct one. They’re ‘close enough,’ however, for this purpose, and this most recent print is almost exactly the same.

Summary of My Post-CPI Tweets (Apr 2018)

Below is a summary of my post-CPI tweets. You can (and should!) follow me @inflation_guyPV and get this in real time, by going to PremoSocial. Or, sign up for email updates to my occasional articles here. Investors with interests in this area be sure to stop by Enduring Investments or Enduring Intellectual Properties. Plus…buy my book about money and inflation. The title of the book is What’s Wrong with Money? The Biggest Bubble of All; order from Amazon here.

  • After a couple of weeks of relative quiet on the inflation theme, it seems people the last few days are talking about it again. Big coverage in the Daily Shot about the underlying pressures.
  • I don’t normally pay much attention to PPI, but it’s hard to ignore the momentum that has been building on that side of things. In particular, the medical care index that PCE uses has been rising rapidly in the PPI. Doesn’t affect us today w/ CPI but affects the Fed convo.
  • But back on CPI. Of course the main focus this month for the media will be the dropping off of the -0.073% m/m figure from March 2017, which will cause y/y CPI to jump to around 2.1% from 1.8%. It’s a known car wreck but the reporters are standing at the scene.
  • That year-ago number of course was caused by cell phone services, which dropped sharply because of the widespread introduction of ‘unlimited data’ plans which the BLS didn’t handle well although they stuck to their methodology.
  • Consensus expectations for this month are for 0.18% on core, which would cause y/y to round down to 2.1%. (Remember that last month, core y/y was very close to rounding up to 1.9%…that shortfall will make this month look even more dramatic.)
  • It would only take 0.22% on core to cause the y/y number to round UP to 2.2%, making the stories even more hyperventilated.
  • I don’t make point estimates of monthly numbers, because the noise swamps the signal. We could get an 0.1% or an 0.3% and it wouldn’t by itself mean much until we knew why. But I will say I think there are risks to a print of 0.22% or above.
  • First, remember the underlying trend to CPI is really about 0.2% anyway. Median inflation is 2.4% and after today core will be over 2%. So using the last 12 months as your base guess is biased lower.
  • Also, let’s look back at last month: Apparel was a big upside surprise for the second month in a row, while shelter was lower than expected. But…
  • But apparel was rebounding from two negative months before that. We’re so used to Apparel declining but really last month just brought it back up to trend. And with the trade tensions and weak dollar, am not really shocked it should be rising some.
  • Apparel is only +0.40% y/y, so it’s not like it needs to correct last month.
  • On the other hand, OER decelerated to 0.20 from 0.28 and primary rents decelerated to 0.20 from 0.34, m/m. But there’s really no reason yet to be looking for rent deceleration – housing prices, in fact, are continuing to accelerate.

  • No reason to think RENTAL costs should be decelerating while PURCHASE costs are still accelerating. Could happen of course, but a repeat of last month’s numbers is less likely.
  • Finally – this gets a little too quanty even for me, but I wonder if last month’s belly flop in CPI could perturb the monthly seasonal adjustments and (mistakenly) overcorrect and push this month higher. Wouldn’t be the first time seasonals bedeviled us.
  • I don’t put a lot of weight on that last speculation, to be clear.
  • Market consensus is clearly for weakness in this print. I’m just not so sure the ball breaks that way. But to repeat what I said up top: the monthly noise swamps the signal so don’t overreact. The devil is in the details. Back up in 5 minutes.
  • ok, m/m core 0.18%. Dang those economists are good. y/y to 2.12%.
  • After a couple of 0.18s, this chart looks less alarming.

  • OK, Apparel did drop again, -0.63% m/m, taking y/y to 0.27%. So still yawning there. Medical Care upticked to 1.99% from 1.76% y/y, reversing last month’s dip. Will dig more there.
  • In rents, OER rose again to 0.31% after 0.20% soft surprise last month, and primary rents 0.26% after a similar figure. y/y figures for OER and Primary Rents are 3.26% and 3.61% respectively. That primary rent y/y is still a deceleration from last mo.
  • Core services…jumped to 2.9% from 2.6%. Again not so surprising since cell phone services dropped out. So that’s the highest figure since…a year ago.
  • Core goods, though, accelerated to -0.3% from -0.5%. That’s a little more interesting. It hasn’t been above 0 for more than one month since 2013, but it’s headed that way.

  • Within Medical Care…Pharma again dragged, -0.16% after -0.44% last month…y/y down to 1.87% from 2.39% two months ago. So where did the acceleration come from?
  • Well, Hospital Services rose from 5.01% to 5.16% y/y, which is no big deal. But doctors’ services printed another positive and moved y/y to -0.83% from -1.27% last month and -1.51% two months ago. Still a long way to go there.

  • Oh wait, get ready for this because the inflation bears will be all about “OH LODGING AWAY FROM HOME HAD A CRAZY ONE-MONTH 2.31% INCREASE.” Which it did. Which isn’t unusual.

  • Interestingly those inflation bears who will tell us how Lodging Away from Home will reverse next month (it will, but hey folks it’s only 0.9% of the index) are the same folks always telling us that AirBnB is killing hotel pricing. MAYBE NOT.
  • Finally making it back to cars. CPI Used cars and trucks had another negative month, -0.33% after -0.26% last month. That really IS a surprise: we’ve never seen the post-hurricane surge that I expected.

  • Sure, used cars are out of deflation, now +0.37% y/y. New cars still deflating at -1.22% vs -1.47% y/y last month. But that really tells you how bad the inventory overhang is in autos. Gonna suck to be an auto manufacturer when the downturn hits. As usual.
  • Leased cars and trucks, interestingly (only 0.64% of CPI) are +5.26% y/y. Look at that trend. Maybe that’s where the demand for cars is going.

  • Oh, how could I forget the star of our show! Wireless telephone services went to -2.41% y/y from -9.43% y/y last month. Probably will go positive over next few months – a real rarity! But after “infinity” data where does the industry go on pricing? Gotta be in the actual price!
  • College tuition and fees: 1.75% y/y from 2.04%. Lowest in a long time. This is a lagged effect of the big stock and bond bull market, and that effect will fade. Tuition prices will reaccelerate.
  • Bigger picture. Core ex-housing rose to 1.23% from 0.92%. Again, a lot of that is cell phone services. But deflation is deep in the rear-view mirror.
  • While I’m waiting for my diffusion stuff to calculate let’s look ahead. We’re at 2.1% y/y core CPI now. The next m/m figures to “roll off” from last year are 0.09, 0.08, 0.14, and 0.14.
  • In other words, core is still going to be accelerating optically even if there’s no change in the underlying, modestly accelerating trend. Next month y/y core will be 2.2%, then 2.3%, then 2.4%. May even reach 2.5% in the summer.
  • This is also not in isolation. The Underlying Inflation Gauge is over 3% for the first time in a long time. Global inflation is on the rise and Chinese inflation just went to the highest level it has seen in a while.
  • One of the stories I’m keeping an eye on too is that long-haul trucker wages are accelerating quickly because new technology has been preventing drivers from exceeding their legal driving limits…which has the effect of restraining supply in trucking capacity.
  • …and that feeds into a lot of things. Until of course the self-driving cars or drone air force takes care of it.
  • The real question, of course, is whence inflation goes after the summer. I believe it will continue to rise as higher interest rates help to goose money velocity after a long time. But it takes time for that theme to play out.
  • time for four-pieces. Here’s Food & Energy.

  • Core goods. Consistent with our theme. it’s going higher.

  • OK, here’s where cell phone services come in: core services less rent of shelter. So the recent jump is taking us back to where we were a year ago. Real question here is whether medical rallies. Some signs in PPI it may be.

  • Rent of Shelter continues to be on our model. Some will look for a reversal in this little jump – not me.

  • Another month where one of the OER subindices will probably be the median category so my guess won’t be fabulous. It will probably either be 0.26% m/m on median (pushing y/y to 2.49%), or 0.20% (y/y to 2.44%). Either way it’s a y/y acceleration.
  • Oh, by the way…10y breakevens are unchanged on the day. This is the second month of data that was ‘on target,’ but surprised the real inflation bears. There isn’t anything really weird here or doomed to be reversed…at least, nothing large.
  • Bottom line for markets is core CPI will continue to climb; core PCE will continue to climb. For at least a few more months (and probably longer, but next 3-4 are baked into the cake). Even though this is known…I don’t know that the Fed and markets will react well to it.
  • That’s all for today, unless I think of something in 5 minutes as usually happens. Thanks for subscribing!!

As I said in the tweet series – this was at some level a ham-on-rye report, coming in right on consensus expectations. But some observers had looked for as low as 0.11% or 0.13% – some of them for the second month in a row – and those observers are either going to have to get religion or keep being wrong. There are a couple of takeaways here and one of them is that even ham-on-rye reports are going to cause y/y CPI to rise over the next four months. This is entirely predictable, as is the fact that core PCE will also be rising rapidly (and possibly more rapidly since medical care in the PCE seems to be turning up more quickly). But that doesn’t mean that the market won’t react to it.

There are all sorts of things that we do even though we know we shouldn’t. I would guess that most of us, noticing that our sports team won when we wore a particular shirt or a batter hit a home run when we pet the dog a certain way, have at some point in the past succumbed to the “well, maybe I should do it just in case” aspect of superstition. But there’s more to it than that. In the case of markets, it is well and good to say “I know this isn’t surprising to see year-on-year inflation numbers rising,” but there’s the second-level issue: “…but I don’t know that everyone else won’t be surprised or react, so maybe I should do something.”

By summertime, core CPI will have reached its highest level since the crisis. Core PCE will probably also have reached its highest level since the crisis. Median CPI has been giving us a steadier reading and so perhaps will not be at new highs, but it will be near the highest readings of the last decade. I believe that whether we think it should happen or not, the dot plots will move higher (unless growth stalls, which it may) and markets will have to deal with the notion that additional increases in inflation from there would be an unmitigated negative. So we will start to price that in.

Moreover, I am not saying that there aren’t underlying pressures that may, and indeed I think will, continue to push prices higher. In fact, I think that there is some non-zero chance of an inflationary accident. And, in the longer run, I am really, really concerned about trade. It doesn’t take a trade war to cause inflation to rise globally; it just takes a loss of momentum on the globalization front and I think we already have that. A bona fide trade war…well, it’s a really bad outcome.

I don’t think that just because China has been making concessionary noises that a trade spat with China has been averted. If I were China, then I too would have made those statements: because the last half-dozen Administrations would have been content to take that as a sign of victory, trumpet it, and move on. But the Trump Administration is different (as if you hadn’t noticed!). President Trump actually seems hell-bent on really delivering on his promises in substance, not in mere appearance. That can be good or bad, depending on whether you liked the promise! In this case, what I am saying is – the trade conflict is probably not over. Don’t make the mistake of thinking the usual political dance will play out when the newest dancer is treating it like a mosh pit.

And all of this is pointed the same direction. It’s time, if you haven’t yet done it, to get your inflation-protection house in order! (And, one more pitch: at least part of that should be to subscribe to my cheapo PremoSocial feed, to stay on top of inflation-related developments and especially the monthly CPI report! For those of you who have…I hope you feel you’re getting $10 of monthly value from it! Thanks very much for your support.)

Trade Surplus and Budget Deficit? Ouch.

The market gyrations of late are interesting, especially during the NCAA Basketball tourney. Normally, volatility declines when these games are on during the week, as traders watch their brackets as much as they do the market (I’ve seen quantitative analysis that says this isn’t actually true, but I’m skeptical since I’ve been there and I can promise you – the televisions on the trading floor are tuned to the NCAA, not the CNBC, on those days). Higher volatility not only implies that lower prices are appropriate in theory but it also tends to happen in practice: higher actual volatility tends to force leveraged traders to reduce position size because their calculation of “value at risk” or VAR generally uses trailing volatility; moreover, these days we also need to be cognizant of the small, but still relevant, risk-parity community which will tend to trim the relative allocation to equities when equity vol rises relative to other asset classes.

My guess is that the risk-parity guys probably respond as much to changes in implied volatility as to realized volatility, so some of that move has already happened (and it’s not terribly large). But the VAR effect is entirely a lagging effect, and it’s proportional to the change in volatility as well as to the length of time the volatility persists (since one day’s sharp move doesn’t change the realized volatility calculation very much). Moreover, it doesn’t need to be very large per trader in order to add up to a very large effect since there are many, many traders who use some form of VAR in their risk control.

Keep in mind that a sharp move higher, as the market had yesterday, has as much effect on VAR as a sharp move lower. The momentum guys care about direction, but the VAR effect is related to the absolute value of the daily change. So if you’re bullish, you want a slow and steady move higher, not a sharp move higher. Ideally, that slow and steady move occurs on good volume, too.

The underlying fundamentals, of course, haven’t changed much between Friday and Monday. The chance of a trade war didn’t decline – the probability of a trade war is now 1.0, since it has already happened. Unless you want to call an attack and counterattack a mere skirmish, rather than a trade war, there is no longer any debate about whether there will be conflict on trade; the only discussion is on magnitude. And on that point, nothing much has changed either: it was always going to be the case that the initial salvo would be stridently delivered and then negotiated backwards. I’m not sure why people are so delighted about the weekend’s developments, except for the fact that investors love stories, and the story “trade war is ended!” is a fun story to tell the gulli-bulls.

As a reminder, it isn’t necessary to get Smoot/Hawley 2.0 to get inflation. Perhaps you need Smoot/Hawley to get another Depression, but not to get inflation. The mere fact that globalization is arrested, rather than continuing to advance, is enough to change the tradeoff between growth and inflation adversely. And that has been in the cards since day 1 of the Trump Administration. A full-on trade war, implying decreased globalization, changes the growth/inflation tradeoff in a very negative way, implying much tighter money growth will be required to tamp down inflation, which implies higher interest rates. I’m not sure we aren’t still headed that way.

But there is a much bigger issue on trade, which also implies higher interest rates…perhaps substantially higher interest rates. We (and by ‘we’ I mean ‘he’) are trying to reduce the trade deficit while increasing the budget deficit sharply. This can only happen one way, and that is if domestic savings increases drastically. I wrote about this point first in 2010, and then re-blogged it in 2013, here. I think that column is worth re-reading. Here’s a snippet:

“And this leads to the worry – if the trade deficit explodes, then two other things are going to happen, although how much of each I can’t even guess: (I) protectionist sentiment is going to become very shrill, and fall on the ears of a President who is looking to burnish his populist creds, and (II) the dollar is going to be beaten like a red-headed stepchild (being a red-headed stepchild, I use that simile grudgingly).”

Well, it took a while to happen and I never dreamed the “President looking to burnish his populist creds” would be a (supposed) Republican…but that’s what we have.

Here’s the updated chart showing the relationship between these two variables.

It’s important to remember that you can’t have a trade account surplus and a financial account surplus. If someone sells a good to a US consumer, that seller holds dollars and they can either sell the dollars to someone else (in which case the problem just changes hands), buy a US good (in which case there’s no trade deficit), or buy a US security. If we need non-US persons to buy US securities, then we need to run a trade deficit. If we want to run flat on trade, then we either need to run a balanced budget or fund the difference out of domestic savings. A large increase in domestic savings implies a large decrease in domestic spending, especially if the Fed is now ‘dissaving’ by reducing its balance sheet. Inducing extra domestic savings also implies higher real interest rates. Now, this isn’t a cataclysmic result – more domestic savings implies more long-term domestic growth, although perhaps not if it’s being sopped up by the federal government – but it’s a very large shift to what the current balances are.

If you want to run a flat balance of trade, the best way to do it is to run a balanced federal budget. Going opposite directions in those two accounts implies uncomfortably large shifts in the account that makes up the difference: domestic savings, and large shifts in interest rates to induce that savings.

Re-Blog: Limits on the 500-pound Gorilla

February 22, 2018 5 comments

With interest rates flirting with 3% on the 10-year Treasury note, and the potential (and eventuality) that they will go significantly higher, I thought it might be timely to review a blog post from February 10, 2013 called “Limits on the 500-pound Gorilla.” (It’s worth reading that original post for some of the comments attached thereto.)


Well, here’s an interesting little tidbit. (But first, a note from our sponsors: some channels didn’t pick up my article from  last Wednesday, “Fun With The CPI,” so follow that link if you’d like to read it.)

The Fed adds permanent reserves by buying securities, as we all know by now. The Open Market Desk buys securities and credits the Fed account of the selling institution. Conversely, when the Fed subtracts reserves permanently, it sells securities and debits the account of the buying institution.

As of February 6th, the Fed owned $1.782 trillion in face value of Treasury and agency mortgage-backed securities. At the closing prices from Friday, those securities are worth $2.069 trillion, plus accrued interest which I didn’t bother to calculate.

So let’s revisit for a second the question of how the Fed would unwind the quantitative easing and actually tighten policy. In order to do that, the Fed would first need to vaporize the $1.58 trillion that exists in excess reserves, before they could actually affect the required reserves which is where the rubber meets the road for monetary policy (at least, in the absence of the “portfolio balance channel”).

We have reviewed some of the options before: sell the securities held in the System Open Market Account (SOMA); conduct massive and long-dated repo operations; sell bills or pay interest on deposits at the Fed (or raise IOER). Some people have suggested that the Fed could just “let the securities in the SOMA roll off”: i.e., let the bonds mature and don’t reinvest the proceeds. I was curious how long, after Operation Twist, such a passive approach would take.

The current value of Excess Reserves is $1.58 trillion. If Excess Reserves did not move for any other reason, it would take until November of 2039 before we saw that many bonds mature. To be fair, with coupon payments and such it would take less time, but we’re still looking at a couple of decades. So that’s not an option, at least by itself.

Then I noticed something interesting. Some economists have suggested that when the economy begins to improve, the Desk could simply start selling securities into the market, since with a stronger economy the Treasury would presumably be running a smaller deficit (now, that’s blind faith if ever there was such a thing) and auctioning fewer securities, so the Fed could take up the slack without impacting the market very much. Leaving aside the question that it isn’t clear that market rates would be in the range they are now if the Fed actually stopped buying (after all, that’s the whole point of the portfolio balance channel – that investors won’t pay the high price the Fed has set so they buy riskier securities), I’m not sure it’s even possible that the Fed could drain the excess reserves even if they sold every single bond on their balance sheet. Here’s why.

The SOMA portfolio has a DV01 of approximately $1.56billion, based on the reported holdings and Bloomberg’s calculated modified duration. For those unfamiliar with bond math, this means that every 1/100th of 1% rise in interest rates causes the value of the Fed’s holdings to decline $1.56bln.

The current market value of the portfolio, as I said, is $2.07 trillion, while Excess Reserves are $1.58 trillion. But the problem is that the ‘market value’ of the portfolio assumes the portfolio is liquidated at mid-market prices. Ask the London Whale how well that works when you are a big player. Ask Long Term Capital.

But forget about the market impact. Suppose interest rates were to rise 300bps, so that the 10-year was around 5% and, with expected inflation remaining (again, let’s go with the blind faith argument) around 2.5%, real interest rates were up to around 2.5%. That would be a fairly neutral valuation for an economy with decent prospects and contained inflation, growing at its sustainable natural growth rate.

The SOMA portfolio, valued 300bps higher in yield, would be worth $2.07T – $1.56B * 300 = 1.60T. In other words, if the Fed sold every single bond in its portfolio, 300bps higher, it would just barely be able to drain all of the excess reserves. Yes, I did ignore the question of convexity, but since the MBS tend to have negative convexity that balances the positive convexity of the Treasuries, I suspect that isn’t a huge effect over this small a move.

So the Fed, in this circumstance, would have used all of its gunpowder just getting back to the point where traditional tools would begin to work again. This is an entirely natural outcome, by the way! If a behemoth market participant lurches into the market to buy securities, and then lurches to sell them, and repeats that pattern over and over, it loses value because it is consuming liquidity in both directions. It is going to be buying high (and again, that’s the Fed’s goal here: to pay more than anyone else wants to pay) and selling low. So in this case, if rates rise 300bps, the Fed will be unwinding its entire portfolio and have no securities left to sell to actually drain the liquidity that matters.

This is obviously a thought experiment – I can’t imagine the Fed could unwind that sort of portfolio with only a 300bp market impact. But it just highlights, for me, the fact that the ‘end game’ for the FOMC almost must involve raising the interest paid on excess reserves – the other tools aren’t only impractical in size, but may be de facto impotent (because, remember, the first thing that needs to happen is that Excess Reserves are drained, before policy has traction again through the traditional channels).

I am sure someone else has pointed out this little mathematics dilemma before, but I don’t think it had previously occurred to me. I guess I’d always stopped at the mechanics/feasibility of selling $2 trillion in securities, and never asked whether that would actually do the job. I don’t think it would! It is not actually true that a 500-lb gorilla sits “anywhere he wants,” as the old joke goes – he can’t sit anywhere that won’t hold a 500-lb gorilla.

Now, the Committee doesn’t really seem to believe in traditional monetary policy any more, so it may be that they figure the reverse of the “portfolio balance channel” effect will be good enough: raise the returns to the ‘less risky’ part of the market enough to pull capital out of the risky parts of the market. But I find it hard to convince myself that, as much as they clearly intended to push housing and equity market prices higher, they’d be willing to do the opposite. And I do believe that other stakeholders (e.g., Congress) would be less accommodating in that direction. Which brings me back again to the conclusion I keep coming to: does the Fed theoretically have the tools to reverse QE? Yes, although they have one fewer than I thought yesterday. But is it plausible that the Fed will have the will to use those tools, to the degree they’d need to be used, to reverse QE? I really don’t believe they’d be willing to crash the housing and stock markets, just to cool down inflation.

We do live in interesting times. And they will remain interesting for a long, long time.

Are Rising Yields Actually a Good Thing?

February 6, 2018 2 comments

I’ve recently been seeing a certain defense of equities that I think is interesting. It runs something like this:

The recent rise in interest rates, which helped cause the stock market swoon, is actually a good thing because interest rates are rising due to a strong economy and increasing demand for capital, which pushes up interest rates. Therefore, stocks should actually not mind the increase in interest rates because it’s an indication of a strong economy.

This is a seductive argument. It’s wrong, but it’s seductive. Not only wrong, in fact, but wrong in ways that really shouldn’t confuse any economist or strategist writing in the last twenty years.

Up until the late 1990s, we couldn’t really tell the main reason that nominal interest rates were rising or falling. For an increase in market rates there are two main potential causes: an increase in real interest rates, which can be good if that increase is being caused by an increasing demand for credit rather than by a decreasing supply, and an increase in inflation expectations, which is an unalloyed negative. But in 1995, we would have had to just guess which was causing the increase in interest rates.

But since 1997, we’ve had inflation-linked bonds, which trade on the basis of real yield. So we no longer have to guess why nominal rates are rising. We can simply look.

The chart below shows the decomposition of 10-year nominal yields since early December. The red line, which corresponds to the left scale, shows “breakevens,” or the simple difference between real yields and nominal yields; the blue line, on the right-hand scale, shows real yields. So if you combine the two lines at any point, you get nominal yields.

Real yields represent the actual supply and demand for the use of capital. That is, if I lend the government money for ten years, then in order to entice me to forego current consumption the government must promise that every year I will accumulate about 0.68% more ‘stuff.’ I can consume more in the future by not consuming as much now. To turn that into a nominal yield, I then have to add some premium to represent how much the dollars I will get back in the future, and which I will use to buy that ‘stuff’, will have declined in value. That of course is inflation expectations, and right now investors who lend to the government are using about 2.1% as their measure of the rate of deterioration of the value of the dollar.[1]

So, can we say from this chart that interest rates are mainly rising for “good” reasons? On the contrary! The increase in inflation expectations has been much steadier; only in the last month have real interest rates risen (and we don’t know, by the way, whether they’re even rising because of credit demand, rather than credit supply). Moreover – although you cannot see this from the chart, I can tell you based on proprietary Enduring Intellectual Properties research that at this level of yields, real yields are usually responsible for almost all of the increase or decrease in nominal yields.[2] So the fact that real yields are providing a little less than half of the selloff? That doesn’t support the pleasant notion of a ‘good’ bond selloff at all.

As I write this, we are approaching the equity market close. For most of the day, equities have been trading a bit above or a bit below around Monday’s closing level. While this beats the heck out of where they were trading overnight, it is a pretty feeble technical response. If you are bullish, you would like to see price reject that level as buyers flood in. But instead, there was pretty solid volume at this lower level. That is more a bearish sign than a bullish sign. However, given the large move on Friday and Monday it was unlikely that we would close near unchanged – so the last-hour move was either going to be significantly up or significantly down. Investors chose up, which is good news. But the bad news is that the end-of-day rally never took us above the bounce-high from yesterday’s last hour, and was on relatively weak volume…and I also notice that energy prices have not similarly rallied.


[1] In an article last week I explained why we tend to want to use inflation swaps rather than breakevens to measure inflation expectations, but in this case I want to have the two pieces add up to nominal Treasury yields so I am stuck with breakevens. As I noted in that article, the 2.1% understates what actual inflation expectations are for 10 years.

[2] TIPS traders would say “the yield beta between TIPS and nominals is about 1.0.”

Historical Context Regarding Market Cycles

February 5, 2018 4 comments

I really enjoy listening to financial media outlets on days like this. Six days removed from all-time highs, the equity guys – especially the strategists, who make their money on the way up – talk about “capitulation,” and how “nothing has changed,” and how people need to “invest for the long-term.” If equities have entered a bear market, they will say this all the way down.

It helps to have seen a few cycles. Consider the early-2000s bear market. In 2000, the Nasdaq crested in March. After a stomach-churning setback, it rallied back into August (the S&P actually had its highest monthly close for that cycle in August). The market then dropped again, bounced, dropped again, bounced, and so on. Every bounce on the way down, the stock market shills shrieked ‘capitulation’ and called it a buying opportunity. Eventually it was, of course. But if there is a bear market, there will be plenty of time to buy later. This was also true in ’09, which was much more of a ‘spike’ bottom but let’s face it, you had months and months to get in…except that no one wanted to get in at the time.

If it is not a bear market, then sure – it’s a buying opportunity. But what I know from watching this drama play out several times is that you cannot tell at the time whether it’s a buying opportunity, or a dead-cat bounce. It does not help at all to say “but the economy is okay.” Recalling that the Nasdaq’s peak was in March 2000: the Fed was still hiking rates in May of that year, and didn’t cut rates until 2001.  In late July 2000, GDP printed 5.2% following 4.8% in Q1. In October 2000, GDP for Q3 was reported to still be at 2.2%. Waiting for the economy to tell you that all was not well was very costly. By the time the Fed was alarmed enough to ease, in a surprise move on January 3, 2001, the S&P was down 16%. But fortunately, that ended it as stocks jumped 5% on the Fed’s move. Buy the dip!

By mid-2002, stocks were down about 50% from the high. Buying the dip was in that case precisely wrong.

Then there is the bear market of a decade ago. The October 2007 market high happened when the economy was still strong, although there were clearly underlying stresses in mortgages and mortgage banking and the Fed was already easing. Yet, on January 10, 2008, Fed Chairman Bernanke said “the Federal Reserve is not currently forecasting a recession.” On January 18, he said the economy “has a strong labor force, excellent productivity and technology, and a deep and liquid financial market that is in the process of repairing itself.” In June 2008, he said “The risk that the economy has entered a substantial downturn appears to have diminished over the past month or so.” Stocks were already down 19%. It got somewhat worse…and it didn’t take long.

So the thing to remember is this: equities do not wait for earnings to suffer, or for forecasts of earnings to suffer, or for everyone to figure out that growth is flagging, or for someone to ring a bell. By the time we know why stocks are going down, it is too late. This is why using some discipline is important – crossing the 200-day moving average, or value metrics, or whatever. Or, decide you’ll hold through the -50% moves and ignore all the volatility. Good luck…but then why are you reading market commentary?

I don’t know that stocks are going to enter a bear market. I don’t know if they’ll go down tomorrow or next week or next month. I have a pretty strong opinion about expected real returns over the next 10 years. And for that opinion to be realized, there will have to be a bear market (or two) in there somewhere. So it will not surprise me at any time if a bear market begins, especially from lofty valuation levels. But my point in this article is just to provide some historical context. And my general advice, which is not specific to any particular person reading this, is that if anyone tells you that price moves like this are ‘capitulation’ to be followed by ‘v-shaped recoveries,’ then don’t just walk away but run away. They haven’t any idea, and that advice might make you a few percent or lose you 50%.

To be sure, don’t panic and abandon whatever plan you had, simply because other people are nervous. As Frank Herbert wrote, “fear is the mind-killer. Fear is the little-death that brings total obliteration.” This is why having a plan is so important! And I also think that plans should focus on the long term, and on your personal goals, and matching your long-term investments to those goals. Rebalancing and compounding are powerful tools, as is a value ethic of buying securities that have a margin of safety.

And, of course, diversification. Bonds today did what they’re supposed to do when ‘risky assets’ take a tumble: they rallied. As I noted on Friday: “I am not saying that interest rates are going directly from 3% to 6%. Indeed, the rates/equity ecosystem is inherently self-dampening to some degree (at least, until we reach a level where we’ve exceeded the range of the spring’s elasticity!) in that if equity prices were to head very much lower, interest rates would respond under a belief that central bankers would moderate their tightening paths in the face of weak equities.” The problem with nominal bonds at this point, though, is that they’re too expensive. At these yields, there is a limit to the diversification they can provide, especially if what is going to drive the bear market in stocks is rising inflation. Bonds will diversify against the sharp selloff, but not against the inflation spiral. (I’ve said it before and I will say it again. If you haven’t read Ben Inker’s piece in the latest GMO quarterly, arguing why inflation is a bigger risk for portfolios right now than recession, do so. “What happened to inflation? And What happens if it comes back?”)

Which brings us to commodities. If the factor driving an equity bear market turns out to be inflation, then commodities should remain uncoupled from equities. For the last few days, commodity indices have declined along with equities – not nearly as much, of course, but the same sign. But if the problem is a fear of inflation then commodities should be taking the baton from stocks.

So there you go. If the problem is rising interest rates, then that is a slow-moving problem that’s self-limiting because central banks will bring rates back down if stocks decline too far. If the problem is rising inflation, then commodities + inflation bonds should beat equities+nominal bonds. Given that commodities and inflation bonds are both relatively cheaper than their counterparts, I’d rather bet that way and have some protection in both circumstances.

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