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Winter Is Coming

February 10, 2015 5 comments

Sometimes being a value investor, amid overvalued (and ever more so) markets, feels a bit like being a Stark in Westeros. The analogy will be lost on you if you do not follow Game of Thrones, but the Starks hold the largest of the sub-kingdoms in Westeros. This kingdom also happens to be the coldest, and the sober Starks are always reminding people that “Winter is coming.”

I should observe that winter in Westeros is a much more serious affair than it is around here; it comes at odd intervals but can last for years. So being prepared for winter is really important. However, getting people to prepare for winter during the long “summer” is very difficult.

Sound familiar? The thing to keep in mind is that the Starks are always right, eventually, and they’re the ones who come through the winter in the best shape. Such is the case with value investors. (Some people might prefer calling value investors who are bearish on stocks right now “Chicken Littles” but I prefer being compared to Ned Stark, thanks. Although both of them have been known to lose their heads on occasion.)

Fortunately, it does not appear that winter is coming to the U.S. very soon. Friday’s Employment report was strong, despite the beginnings of downsizing in the oil and gas extraction businesses. The chart below shows the Baker Hughes oil and gas rig count, which is falling at a rate every bit as fast as it did in the credit crisis.

rig count

Yet, the U.S. economy as a whole generated 267,000 new jobs last month, which was above expectations. It is unlikely that this pace will continue, since the extraction (and related industry) jobs will be a drag. But in 2008, this happened when every other industry was being squeezed, and in the current case other industries are being squeezed by the strong dollar, but only mildly so. I think this will actually serve to increase the labor force participation rate, which has been in a downtrend for a long time – because laid-off oil workers will still be in the labor force looking for work, while other jobs will be getting filled by (sometimes) discouraged workers coming off the sidelines. So we may well see the Unemployment Rate rise even as jobs growth remains reasonable, even if less robust than the most recent figures.

Winter, though, is still coming.

In the near-term, winter is coming to Europe. Unusually, it is moving from the south to the north because Greece appears to be finally heading for the denouement that has been utterly unavoidable from the beginning. I wrote this in June 2012 (and I wasn’t the only one saying such things – the only real question has been how long it would take before the Greeks decided they’d had enough of sacrifice to hold together the Eurozone for the elites):

Greece will still leave the Euro. Government or no government, austerity or no austerity – the fiscal math simply doesn’t make sense unless Europe wants to pay for Greece forever. In principle, the Greeks can dig themselves out of trouble if they work harder, retire later, pay more taxes, and receive fewer government services. I do believe that people can change, and a society can change, under pressure of crisis. Remember Rosie the Riveter? But the question is whether they can change, whether they will change, do they even want to change, if the benefit of the change flows not to Greece’s people but to the behemoth European institutions that have lent money to Greece?

If a person declares bankruptcy, and the judge declares that he must pay all of his wages for the next thirty years, after deducting enough for food and shelter, to the creditors…do you think that person is going to go looking for a 60-hour workweek?

Am I sure that Greece is going to leave the Euro in a week, or a month, or a year? Not at all. The institutional self-preservation meme is very strong and I am always amazed at how long it takes obvious imperatives to actually happen.[1] But I am quite confident that Greece will eventually leave the Euro, and it does seem as if parties on all sides of the negotiating table are coming to that conclusion as well.

One question that authorities have had to come to peace with first was whether Grexit is really Armageddon. I have argued that default and an exit from the Euro is not bad for Greece, at least when compared to a multi-year depression.

And it’s probably not even horrible for Europe, or the world at large, at least compared to the credit crisis, despite all protestations that this would be “Lehman squared.” Again, this is old news and as I lay out the reasoning here there is no reason to repeat myself.

But it won’t be a positive thing. And it is likely to bring on “winter,” economically. Helpfully, the world’s central banks not only remain in easing mode but are increasing the dovishness of their stance, with the ECB foremost among the central banks that are priming the pumps again. M2 money growth in the Eurozone was up to 4.5% y/y in December (latest data available), with the highest quarter-over-quarter growth rate (8.3%, annualized) in money since the end of 2008! Meanwhile the Fed, while it is no longer adding to reserves, is still watching the money supply grow at 6% y/y with no good way to stop it. For all the talk about the FOMC hiking rates by mid-year, I think the probable rise in the Unemployment Rate discussed above, plus the weak inflation readings (with the notable exception of Median CPI), plus the fact that all other central banks are easing and likely to continue doing so, plus the probability of turbulence in Europe, makes it very unlikely that this Committee, with a very dovish makeup, will be tightening any time soon.

The likely onset of some winter will not help hold down inflation, however. Upward pressures remain, and the fact that the ECB is now running the pumps makes higher prices more likely. Yes, we care about money supply growth in Europe: the chart below shows the M2 growth of the US and Europe combined, against core CPI in the US. The fit is actually better than with US CPI alone.

m2prices

Now, some markets are priced for winter and some are not. We think that real interest rates in Europe are far too low compared to real rates in the US, and stock prices in the US are too high compared to stock prices in Europe. The first chart below shows the spread of 10-year real rates in the US minus Europe (showing US yields are high compared to European yields); the second chart shows the ratio of the S&P 500 to the Eurostoxx 50.

realratespreadUSEU

spxeurostoxx

You can see in the latter chart that the out-performance of the S&P has proceeded since 2009, while the under-performance of US inflation-linked bonds has only happened since 2012, so these are not simply two ways of looking at the same trade. In both cases, these deviations are quite extreme. But the European economy and the US economy are not completely independent of one another; weak European growth affects US corporate entities and vice-versa, and as I suggest above the growth of European money supply tends to affect US inflation as well. We think that (institutional) investors should buy TIPS and sell European linkers, and also buy European stocks against US stocks. By doing both of these things, the exposure to currency flows or general trends in global equity market pricing is lessened. (Institutional investors interested in how we would weight such a trade should contact us.)

[1] As another example, take the shrinking of Wall Street. It was obvious after 2008 that it had to happen; only recently, however, as banks and dealers have been forced to become more and more like utilities have we started to see layoffs while stocks are rising, which is very unusual. But Wall Street defended the bloated structures of the past for more than six years!

The F9 Problem

February 3, 2015 Leave a comment

All around the world, investors and traders and even fancy hedge-fund guys are dealing with something that denizens of the inflation-linked bond world have been dealing with for some time.

I call it the F9 problem. Please come with me as I descend into geekdom.

You would be surprised to learn how many of the world’s major traders of bonds and derivatives rely for a significant amount of their analysis on the infrastructure of Microsoft Excel. While many major dealers have sophisticated calculation engines and desktop applications, nothing has yet been designed that offers the flexibility and transparency of Excel for designing real-time analytical functions on the fly. Bloomberg and other data providers have also built add-ins for Excel such that a subscriber can pull in real-time data into these customized calculation tools, which means that an Excel-based platform can be used to manage real-time trading.

When I have taught bond math, or programs like inflation modeling at the New York Society of Securities Analysts, I have had students design spreadsheets that built yield curves, calculated duration and convexity, valued vanilla derivative products, and so on. There are few better ways to learn the nuts and bolts of bond math than to build a spreadsheet to build a LIBOR swap curve. And, if you are doing anything very unique at all, being able to see and follow the whole calculation (and possibly amend or append additional calculations as necessary) is invaluable. When I was trading at two different Wall Street shops, the inflation book’s risk was pulled into my spreadsheets daily and manipulated so that I could understand all of its dimensions. This is, in short, very common.

It turns out that two very important Excel functions in bond portfolio management are PRICE() and MDURATION(). And it also turns out that these functions return an error at negative bond yields. All over the world, right now, as nominal bonds in various countries are trading at negative yields, whole armies of portfolio managers are saying “why is my spreadsheet saying “#NUM!” everywhere? I call this the F9 problem because when you hit F9 in Excel, it calculates your workbook. And that’s when you see the problem.

There is nothing about the price-from-yield formula that is insoluble at negative yields. The price of a bond is simply the sum of the present values of its cash flows. If using a single yield to maturity to price such a bond, a negative yield simply means that the present-value factors become greater than 1, rather than less than 1, in the future. This is odd, but mathematically speaking so what? There is no reason that PRICE() should produce an error at negative yields. But it does.

There is also nothing about the modified duration formula that is insoluble at negative yields. Macaulay duration is the present-value-weighted average time periods to maturity, which (aside from the weirdness of future cash flows being worth more than present cash flows, which is what a negative yield implies) has a definite solution. And modified duration, which is what MDURATION() is supposed to calculate, is simply Macaulay Duration divided by one plus the yield to maturity. While this does have the weird property that modified duration is less than Macaulay duration unless yields are negative, there’s nothing disqualifying there either. So there is no reason why MDURATION() should produce an error at negative yields. But it does.

I don’t know why Microsoft implemented bond functions that don’t work at negative yields, except that, well, it’s Microsoft and they probably didn’t thoroughly test them.

The good news is that inflation-indexed bonds have long had negative yields, so inflation guys solved this problem some time ago. Indeed, it only recently occurred to me that there’s a whole new cadre of frustrated fixed-income people out there.

Let me help. Here are the Visual Basic functions I use for the price from yield of TIPS or other US Treasuries, and for their modified durations. They’re simply implementations of the standard textbook formulas for yield-to-price and for modified duration. They’re not beautiful – I hadn’t planned to share them. But they work. I believe they require the Analysis Toolpak and Analysis Toolpak – VBA add-ins, but I am not entirely sure of that. No warranty is either expressed or implied!

 

 

Function EnduringPricefromYield(Settlement As Date, Maturity As Date, Coupon As Double, Yield As Double)

Dim price As Double

accumulator = 0

firstcoup = WorksheetFunction.CoupPcd(Settlement, Maturity, 2, 1)

priorcoup = firstcoup

Do Until priorcoup = Maturity

   nextcoup = WorksheetFunction.CoupNcd(priorcoup, Maturity, 2, 1)

   If accumulator = 0 Then

       dCF = (nextcoup – Settlement) / (nextcoup – priorcoup)

       x = dCF / 2

       Else

       x = x + 0.5

   End If

   pvcashflow = Coupon * 100 / 2 / (1 + Yield / 2) ^ (2 * x)

   accumulator = accumulator + pvcashflow

   priorcoup = nextcoup

Loop

‘add maturity flow and last coupon

   accumulator = accumulator + 100 / (1 + Yield / 2) ^ (2 * x)

‘subtract accrued int

   price = accumulator – WorksheetFunction.AccrInt(firstcoup, WorksheetFunction.CoupNcd(firstcoup, Maturity, 2, 1), Settlement, Coupon, 100, 2, 1)

   EnduringPricefromYield = price

End Function

 

Function EnduringModDur(Settlement As Date, Maturity As Date, Coupon As Double, Yield As Double)

Dim price As Double

firstcoup = WorksheetFunction.CoupPcd(Settlement, Maturity, 2, 1)

price = EnduringPricefromYield(Settlement, Maturity, Coupon, Yield) + WorksheetFunction.AccrInt(firstcoup, WorksheetFunction.CoupNcd(firstcoup, Maturity, 2, 1), Settlement, Coupon, 100, 2, 1)

accumulator = 0

priorcoup = firstcoup

Do Until priorcoup = Maturity

   nextcoup = WorksheetFunction.CoupNcd(priorcoup, Maturity, 2, 1)

   If accumulator = 0 Then

       dCF = (nextcoup – Settlement) / (nextcoup – priorcoup)

       x = dCF / 2

       Else

       x = x + 0.5

   End If

   pvcashflow = Coupon * 100 / 2 / (1 + Yield / 2) ^ (2 * x)

   accumulator = accumulator + pvcashflow / price * x

   priorcoup = nextcoup

Loop

‘add maturity flow and last coupon

   accumulator = accumulator + (100 * x / (1 + Yield / 2) ^ (2 * x)) / price

   EnduringModDur = accumulator / (1 + Yield / 2)

End Function

Crazy Spot Curves – Orderly Forwards

January 30, 2015 2 comments

This is an interesting chart I think. It shows the spot CPI swap curve (that is, expected 1y inflation, expected 2y compounded inflation, expected 3y compounded inflation), which is very, very steep at the moment because of the plunge in oil. It also shows the CPI swap curve one year forward (that is, expected inflation for 1y, starting in 1y; expected inflation for 2y, starting in 1y; expected inflation for 3y, starting in 1y – in other words, what the spot curve is expected to look like one year from today). The x-axis is the number of years from now.

efficientThe spot curve is so steep, it is hard to tell much about the forward curve so here is the forward curve by itself.

efficient2Basically, after this oil crash passes through the system, the market thinks inflation will be exactly at 2% (a bit lower than the Fed’s target, adjusting for the difference between CPI and PCE, but still amazingly flat) for 6-7 years, and then rise to the heady level of 2.10-2.15% basically forever.

That demonstrates an amazing confidence in the Fed’s power. Since inflation tails are longest to the high side, this is equivalent to pricing either no chance of an inflation tail, or that the Fed will consistently miss on the low side by just about exactly the same amount, and that amount happens to be equal to the value of the tail more or less.

But what is really interesting to me is simply how the wild spot curve translates so cleanly to the forward curve, at the moment.

Categories: Bond Market, Quick One, Theory Tags: ,

Pre-packaged Baloney

January 28, 2015 Leave a comment

Ten-year nominal rates continue to drift back towards the 2012 lows; the 10y Treasury yields only about 1.75% now. But 2015 is so very different than 2012 in terms of the cause of those low rates.

Nominal bonds are like the packaged sandwich you pick up at a gas station: no special orders. You get the meats in the proportions they were put on the sandwich; in the case of nominal bonds you get real yields plus inflation expectations and the nominal yield moves the same amount whether the cause is a change in real yields or a change in inflation expectations. If you buy nominal bonds because you think the economy is growing weak, and you’re right but at the same time inflation expectations rise, then you’re out of luck. You get what’s in the package.

If you look beyond the packaging, to what is making up that 10-year yield sandwich, then the difference between 2015 and 2012 is stark. When 10-year nominal yields were at 1.50% back in 2012, 10-year real yields were at -0.90% and 10-year inflation expectations were around 2.40%. The bond market was pricing in egregiously weak real growth for the next decade, coupled with fairly reasonable inflation expectations. TIPS were clearly expensive at the time, although I argued that they were less expensive than nominal bonds. (In fact, I may have said that they were expensive to everything except nominal bonds).

Today, on the other hand, nominal yields are low for a different reason. TIPS yields, while low, are positive (10-year real yields are 0.13% as I write this) but inflation expectations are very low. So, in contrast to the circumstance in 2012, we see TIPS as very cheap, rather than rich.

One way to look at this difference in circumstance is to study how the proportions of meats in the sandwich have changed over time. The chart below (source: Enduring Investments) shows the percentage of the nominal yield that is made up of real yields. The percentage which is made up of inflation expectations is approximately 100% minus this number, so one chart suffices. Back in “normal times,” real yields tended to make up 40-50% of nominal yields.

real10ratio

That 40-50% isn’t graven in stone; for example, we can say with some confidence that the ratio should be lower at very high nominal yields: if 10-year rates are at 20%, it isn’t because people expect real growth of 8%, but because inflation expectations are quite high. And another line of reasoning applies when nominal yields are very low, because inflation expectations tend to reach a floor. I mention this because I wouldn’t want someone to look at this chart and say “the ratio ought to get back to 40%, and it’s at 7% now, so TIPS are still very expensive.” In fact the relationship is considerably more complex, and as I said before we see TIPS as very cheap, not rich.

That being said, the point is that while nominal yields are similar now to what they were in 2012, the circumstances are quite different and your trading view of nominal bonds must take this into account. In 2012, to be bearish on nominal bonds you mainly had to be of the view that growth expectations were unlikely to get appreciably worse than the awful expectations which were embedded in the market. In 2015, to be bearish on nominal bonds you mainly have to be of the view that inflation expectations are unlikely to get appreciably lower.

Today the Federal Reserve acknowledged that they are concerned with the state of inflation expectations. In the statement following today’s meeting the FOMC noted that “Market-based measures of inflation compensation have declined substantially in recent months” and they repeatedly noted that they need not only inflation but also expectations to move back towards their long-term targets before they start to think about nudging interest rates higher.

It is certainly convenient since median CPI is at 2.2%, which is fairly consistent with where they perceive their target to be. But this is a dovish Fed and they’re not looking anxiously to tighten. Ergo, inflation expectations are now their focus. Beyond that, you can expect them to focus on the 5y forward expectations once spot expectations rise (see chart below, source Enduring Investments, showing 5y and 5y5y forward inflation from CPI swaps).

5y and 5y5y

This is all good for restraining velocity, since lower rates tend to keep money velocity low…except that velocity is already lower than it should be, for this level of rates! And so we come to the last chart of the day: corporate credit growth. To the extent that some part of the decline in money velocity was due to the impairment of banks’ ability to offer credit, this seems to no longer be an issue. Commercial bank credit is up at an 8.7% pace over the last year (11.1% annualized over the last 13 weeks), which looks to be back to normal…if not on the high side of normal.

corpcreditSo, as far as sandwich meats go, the Fed is focusing on a bunch of baloney. There are plenty of reasons to hike rates right now, if they wanted to. They don’t. (Moreover, as I have pointed out before: hiking rates will actually push inflation higher, unless they arrest money growth…which they have little ability to do right now).

Call Off the Deflation Warning

January 7, 2015 9 comments

Today’s column is a brief one, as I need to post a correction. Not a correction to my stuff, mind you, but to others.

Pictures like the below have been circulating now for a couple of weeks. This is a chart of the 2-year inflation “breakeven” on Bloomberg, illustrating how a “deflation warning” is sounding as they go negative.

bad2y

Unfortunately, it ain’t so. I wrote to the authors of the original Bloomberg piece referenced above, and called Bloomberg (more on that later), and figured that when I pointed out that 2-year inflation expectations are nowhere near zero, the story would at least die quietly even if pride prevented a retraction. Unfortunately, that hasn’t happened and other “analysts” and news outlets have picked up the story. So, I need to print a correction for them. Unconventional, I know, but I stand for Truth.

The simple fact is that 2-year inflation expectations have fallen deeply, but remain well above zero. The chart below, also from Bloomberg, shows 2-year inflation swaps over the same period. You will notice that it has fallen mightily but remains at about 0.70%.

2yinflswap

It turns out that the difference between the Jan-17 TIPS (which have 2 years to maturity) and the Jan-17 nominal Treasuries that are their comparator bond – taking the difference between real and nominal rates gives you the “breakeven” inflation rate that makes them equivalent investments; thus the name – is also about 0.70%.

So why does Bloomberg say the 2-year breakeven is negative? Well, Bloomberg’s “policy” is to track the April-2016 TIPS as the “2-year” TIPS until the new April-2020 TIPS are auctioned in April At that time, they will roll to using the April-2017 TIPS, which will have two years to maturity, and will use that bond for a year. While I applaud Bloomberg for having a policy, that’s no excuse for a stupid policy. There is no place in this universe where the April-16s are a 2-year note. Not even close. And not the “best we can do.”

In truth, especially for short-dated inflation expectations there is no reason not to use inflation swaps. The 2-year inflation swap is evergreen each day with a new 2-year maturity, and there are no idiosyncrasies (such as the fact that the April issues often trade cheap because of the bad seasonality associated with them, so they will usually understate true inflation expectations if you use them) to worry about.

So the story is false. The market is not discounting two years of deflation. Indeed, the reality is quite a bit different. The chart below (source: Enduring Investments – we know stuff like this) shows the 1-year inflation rate, starting 1 year from now (the 1y1y or 1×2 if you like), derived from CPI swaps. While it has come down substantially since the summer, it is not particularly out of line. In fact, it’s pretty much right where core inflation is, which makes sense: the energy spike lower is not going to continue year after year, which means that once it stops then headline inflation will return to the neighborhood of core…unless there’s a rebound in gasoline, of course. But the point is that the best guess of inflation one year from now has little to do with gasoline.

1y1yswapActually, the even-deeper point is that it is appalling how little general knowledge there is about inflation, and how journalists and even many analysts have scant idea how to get to the real story. (Hint: calling an inflation expert is a good start.)

Fed Gearing Up to Stand Down

July 30, 2014 8 comments

I guess it’s something about strong growth numbers and a tightening central bank that bonds just don’t like so much. Ten-year Treasury yields rose about 9bps today, under pressure from the realization that higher growth and higher inflation, which is historically a pretty bad cocktail for bonds, is being offset less and less by extraordinary Federal Reserve bond buying. Yields recently had fallen as the Q1 numbers doused the idea that the economic recovery will continue without incident, and as the global political and security situation deteriorated (maybe we will just say it became “less tranquil”). Nominal 10 year yields had dipped below 2.50%, and TIPS yields had reached 0.20% again. It didn’t hurt that so many were leaning on the bear case for bonds and were tortured the further bonds rallied.

Stocks, evidently, didn’t get the message that higher interest rates are more likely, going forward, than lower interest rates. They didn’t get the message that the Fed is going to be less accommodative. They didn’t even get the message that the Fed sees the “likelihood of inflation running persistently below 2 percent has diminished somewhat.” The equity markets ended flat. Sure, it has not been another banner month for the stock jockeys, but with earnings up a tepid 6% or so year/year the market is up nearly 17% so…yes, you did the math right: P/E multiples keep expanding!

My personal theory is that stocks are doing so well because Greenspan thinks they’re expensive. In an interview today on Bloomberg Television, Greenspan said that “somewhere along the line we will get a significant correction.” Historically speaking, the former Chairman’s ability to call a top has been something less than spectacular. After he questioned whether the market might be under the influence of ‘irrational exuberance,’ the market continued to rally for quite some time. Now, he wasn’t alone in being surprised by that, but he also threw in the towel on that view and was full-throatedly bullish through the latter stages of the 1990s equity bubble. So, perhaps, investors are just fading his view. Although to be fair, he did say that he didn’t think equities are “grossly overpriced,” lest anyone think that the guy who could never see a bubble might have actually seen one.

Make no mistake, there is no question that stocks are overvalued by every meaningful metric that has historical support for its predictive power. That does not mean (as we have all learned over the past few years) that the market will decline tomorrow, but it does ensure that future real returns will be punk over a reasonably-long investment horizon.

It will certainly be interesting to see how long markets can remain levitated when the Fed’s buying ceases completely. Frankly, I am a bit surprised that these valuation levels have persisted even this long, especially in the face of rising global tensions and rising inflation. I am a little less surprised that commodities have corrected so much this month after what was a steady but uninspiring move higher over the first 1-2 quarters of 2014. Commodities are simply a reviled asset class at the moment (which makes me love them all the more).

Do not mistake the Fed’s statement (that at the margin the chance of inflation less than 2% is slightly less likely) for hawkishness. And don’t read hawkishness into the mild dissent by Plosser, who merely wanted to remove the reference to time in the description of when raising rates will be appropriate. Chicago Fed President Evans was the guy who originally wanted to “parameterize” the decision to tighten by putting numbers on the unemployment rate and inflation levels that would be tolerable to the Fed (the “Evans Rule”)…levels which the economy subsequently blasted through without any indication that the Fed cared. But Evans himself recently said that “it’s not a catastrophe to overshoot inflation by some amount.” Fed officials are walking back the standards for what constitutes worrisome inflation, in the same way that they walked back the standards for what constitutes too-low an unemployment rate.

This is a good point at which to recall the “Wesbury Map,” which laid out the excuses the Fed can be expected to make when inflation starts being problematic. Wesbury had this list:

  1. Higher inflation is due to commodities, and core inflation remains tame.
  2. Higher core inflation due to housing is just due to housing prices bouncing back to normal, and that’s temporary.
  3. It’s not actual inflation that matters, but what the Fed projects it to be.
  4. It’s okay for inflation to run a little above 2% for a while because it was under that level for so long.
  5. Increasing price pressures are due to something temporary like a weaker dollar or a temporary increase in money velocity or the multiplier.
  6. Well, 3-4% inflation isn’t that bad for the economy, anyway.

I think the order of these excuses can change, but they’re all excuses we can expect to hear trotted out. Charles Evans should have just shouted “FOUR!” Instead, what he actually said was

“Even a 2.4 percent inflation rate, if it’s reasonably well controlled, and the rest of the economy is doing ok, and then policy is being adjusted in order to keep that within a, under a 2.5 percent range — I think that can work out.”

That makes sense. 2.4% is okay, as long as they limit it to 2.5%. That’s awfully fine control, considering that they don’t normally even have the direction right.

Now, although the Evans speech was a couple of weeks ago I want to point out something else that he said, because it is a dangerous error in the making. He argued that inflation isn’t worrisome unless it is tied to wage inflation. I have pointed out before that wages don’t lead inflation; this is a pernicious myth. It is difficult to demonstrate that with econometrics because the data is very noisy, but it is easy to demonstrate another way. If wages led inflation, then we would surely all love inflation, because our buying power would be expanding when inflation increased (since our wages would have already increased prior to inflation increasing). We know, viscerally, that this is not true.

But economists, evidently, do not. The question below is from a great paper by Bob Shiller called “Why Do People Dislike Inflation” (Shiller, Robert, “Why Do People Dislike Inflation?”, NBER Working Paper #5539, April 1996. ©1996 by Robert J. Shiller. Available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w5539). This is a survey question and response, with the economist-given answer separated out from the answer given by real people.

shillerQ

Economists go with the classic answer that inflation is bad mainly because of “menu costs” and other frictions. But almost everyone else knows that inflation makes us poorer, and that very fact implies that wages follow inflation rather than lead.

Put another way: if Evans is going to be calm about inflation until wage inflation is above 3.5%, then we can expect CPI inflation to be streaking towards 4% before he gets antsy about tightening. Maybe this is why the stock market is so exuberant: although the Fed has tightened by removing the extra QE3, a further tightening is evidently a very long way off.

Awareness of Inflation, But No Fear Yet

June 24, 2014 1 comment

Suddenly, there is a bunch of talk about inflation. From analysts like Grant Williams to media outlets like MarketWatch  and the Wall Street Journal (to be sure, the financial media still tell us not to worry about inflation and keep on buying ‘dem stocks, such as Barron’s argues here), and even Wall Street economists like those from Soc Gen and Deutsche Bank…just two name two of many Johnny-come-latelys.

It is a little surprising how rapidly the articles about possibly higher inflation started showing up in the media after we had a bottoming in the core measures. Sure, it was easy to project the bottoming in those core measures if you were paying attention to the base effects and noticing that the measures of central tendency that are more immune to those base effects never decelerated much (see median CPI), but still somehow a lot of people were taken by surprise if the uptick in media stories is any indication.

I actually have an offbeat read of that phenomenon, though. I think that many of these analysts, media outlets, and economists just want to have some record of being on the inflation story at a time they consider early. Interestingly enough, while there is no doubt that the volume of inflation coverage is up in the days since the CPI report, there is still no general alarm. The chart below from Google Trends shows the relative trend in the search term “rising inflation.” It has shown absolutely nothing since the early days of extraordinary central bank intervention.

risinginflationsearch

Now, I don’t really care very much when the fear of inflation broadens. It is the phenomenon of inflation, not the fear of it, which causes the most damage to society. However, there is no doubt that the fear of inflation definitely could cause damage to markets much sooner than inflation itself can. The concern has been rising in narrow pockets of the markets where inflation itself is actually traded, but because we trade headline inflation the information has been obscured. The chart below (source: Enduring Investments) shows the 1-year headline inflation swap, in black, which has risen from about 1.4% to 2.2% since November. But the green line shows the implied core inflation extracted from those swap quotes, and that line has risen from 1.2% in December to 2.6% or so now. That is far more significant – 2.6% core inflation over the next year would mean core PCE would exceed 2% by next spring. This is a very reasonable expectation, but as I said it is still only a narrow part of the market that is willing to bet that way.

coresincedec

If I was long equities – which I am not, as our four-asset-class model currently has only a 7.4% weight in stocks – then I would keep an eye on the search terms and for other anecdotal evidence that inflation fears are starting to actually rise among investors, rather than just being the probably-cynical musings of people who don’t want to be seen as having missed the signs (even if they don’t really believe it).

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