Archive for the ‘Federal Reserve’ Category

The Destination Currency in the Global Carry Trade: USD?

If you are an investor of the Ben Graham school, you’ve lived your life looking for “value” investments with a “margin of safety.” Periodically, if you are a pure value investor, then you go through long periods of pulling your hair out when momentum rules the day, even if you believe – as GMO’s Ben Inker eloquently stated in last month’s letter – that in the long run, no factor is as important to investment returns as valuation.

This is one of those times. Stocks have been egregiously overvalued (using the Shiller CAPE, or Tobin’s Q, or any of a dozen other traditional value metrics) for a very long time now. Ten-year Treasuries are at 1.80% in an environment where median inflation is at 2.5% and rising, and where the Fed’s target for inflation is above the long-term nominal yield. TIPS yields are significantly better, but 10-year real yields at 0.23% won’t make you rich. Commodities are very cheap, but that’s just a bubble in the other direction. The bottom line is that the last few years have not been a great time to be purely a value investor. The value investor laments “why?”, and tries to incorporate some momentum metrics into his or her approach, to at least avoid the value traps.

Well, here is one reason why: the US is the destination currency in the global carry trade.

A “carry trade” is one in which regular returns can be earned simply on the difference in yields between different instruments. If I can borrow at LIBOR flat and lend at LIBOR+2%, I am in a carry trade. Carry trades that are riskless and result from one’s market position (e.g., if I am a bank and I can borrow from 5-year CD customers at 0.5% and invest in 5-year Treasuries at 1.35%) are usually more like accrual trades, and are not what we are talking about here. We are talking about positions that imply some risk, even if it is believed to be small. For example, because we are pretty sure that the Fed will not tighten aggressively any time soon, we could simply buy 2-year Treasuries at 0.88% and borrow the money in overnight repo markets at 0.40% and earn 48bps per year for two years. This will work unless overnight interest rates rise appreciably above 88bps.

We all know that carry trades can be terribly dangerous. Carry trades are implicit short-option bets where you make a little money a lot of the time, and then get run over with some (unknown) frequency and lose a lot of money occasionally. But they are seductive bets since we all like to think we will see the train coming and leap free just in time. There’s a reason these bets exist – someone wants the other side, after all.

Carry trades in currency-land are some of the most common and most curious of all. If I borrow money for three years in Japan and lend it in Brazil, then I expect to make a huge interest spread. Of course, though, this is entirely reflected in the 3-year forward rate between yen and real, which is set precisely in this way (covered-interest arbitrage, it is called). So, to make money on the Yen/Real carry bet, you need to carry the trade and reverse the exchange rate bet at the end. If the Real has appreciated, or has been stable, or has declined only a little, then you “won” the carry trade. But all you really did was bet against the forward exchange rate. Still, lots and lots of investors make precisely this sort of bet: borrowing money is low-interest rate currencies, investing in high-interest-rate currencies, and betting that the latter currency will at least not decline very much.

How does this get back to the value question?

Over the last several years, the US interest rate advantage relative to Europe and Japan has grown. This should mean that the dollar is expected to weaken going forward, so that someone who borrows in Euro to invest in the US ought to expect to lose on the future exchange rate when they cash out their dollars. And indeed, as the interest rate advantage has widened so has the steepness of the forward points curve that expresses this relationship. But, because investors like to go to higher-yielding currencies, the dollar in fact has strengthened.

This flow is a lot like what happens to people on a ship that has foundered on rocks. Someone lowers a lifeboat, which looks like a great deal. So people begin to pour into the lifeboat, and they keep doing so until it ceases, suddenly, to be a good deal. Then all of those people start to wish they had stayed on the ship and waited for help.

In any event, back to value: the chart below (source: Bloomberg) shows the difference between the 10-year US$ Libor swap rate minus the 10-year Euribor swap rate, in white and plotted in percentage terms on the right-hand scale. The yellow line is the S&P 500, and is plotted on the left-hand scale. Notice anything interesting?


The next chart shows a longer time scale. You can see that this is not a phenomenon unique to the last few years.


Yes, the correlation isn’t perfect but to me, it’s striking. And we can probably do better. After all, the chart above is just showing the level of equity prices, not whether they are overvalued or undervalued, and my thesis is that the fact that the US is the high-yielding currency in the carry trade causes the angst for value investors. We can show this by looking at the interest rate spread as above, but this time against a measure of valuation. I’ve chosen, for simplicity, the Shiller Cyclically-Adjusted P/E (CAPE) (Source:


Now, I should take pains to point out that I have not proven any causality here. It may turn out, in fact, that the causality runs the other way: overheated markets lead to tight US monetary policy that causes the interest rate spread to widen. I am skeptical of that, because I can’t recall many episodes in the last couple of decades where frothy markets led to tight monetary policy, but the point is that this chart is only suggestive of a relationship, not indicative of it. Still, it is highly suggestive!

The implication, if there is a causal relationship here, is interesting. It suggests that we need not fear these levels of valuation, as long as interest rates continue to suggest that the US is a good place to keep your money (that is, as long as you aren’t afraid of the dollar weakening). That, in turn, suggests that we ought to keep an eye on rates of change: if the ECB tightens more, or eases less, than is priced into European markets (which seems unlikely), or the Fed tightens less, or eases more, than is priced into US markets (which seems more likely, but not super likely since not much is presently priced in), or the dollar trend changes clearly. When one of those things happens, it will be a sign that not only are the future returns to equities looking unrewarding, but the more immediate returns as well.

Summary of My Post-CPI Tweets

Below is a summary of my post-CPI tweets. You can (and should!) follow me @inflation_guy or sign up for email updates to my occasional articles here. Investors with interests in this area be sure to stop by Enduring Investments. Plus…buy my book about money and inflation, just published! The title of the book is What’s Wrong with Money? The Biggest Bubble of All; order from Amazon here.

  • In prep for CPI: Econs forecasting about 0.15% core; Cleveland Fed’s Nowcast is 0.18%; avg of last 4 months is 0.20%.
  • So, econs which have been too bullish on econ for a year (see citi surprise index) are bearish on CPI.
  • If we get any m/m core less than 0.20% (even 0.19%), y/y will round to 2.1% b/c dropping off high 2015 April.
  • But after that, next 8 months from 2015 were <0.20% so any downtick wouldn’t be start of something new.
  • Hard to tell but the core CPI print was SLIGHTLY above expectations. 0.195%, so y/y was 2.147%.
  • In other words, if someone charged another nickel for a candy bar somewhere we would have had 2.2% again. <<hyperbole
  • That 0.195% m/m was lower than April 2015, but higher than May, June, July, Aug, Sep, Nov, and Dec.
  • Core services unch at 3.0%; core goods downticked to -0.5% y/y.
  • y/y Medical Care decelerated for second month in a row, down to 2.98% y/y; still looks to be in a broad uptrend from 2% in 2014. [ed note: chart added for clarity]


  • Within Medical Care, medicinal drugs accelerated, prof svcs was flat. Hospital svcs dropped from 4.33 to 3.15% y/y
  • Hospital services oscillates – we’ll probably get that back to 4%-4.5% which will push med care back up.
  • Primary Rents 3.73% from 3.66%. OER 3.15% from 3.12%. Some were expecting deceleration there. Not us!
  • Lodging Away from Home dropped to 1.32% from 2.27%. That, and various home furnishings, is why Housing subcat went to 2.12 vs 2.14.
  • But Rents and OER are the stable measures…not Lodging, not furnishings.
  • Core ex-housing fell to 1.39% from 1.48%, but again that’s due to elements of med care and housing that are likely to rebound.
  • Lots of movement within Apparel but overall nothing. The February pop looks like a one-off.
  • Overall, a more buoyant number than expected and the stuff holding core CPI down are the transient things.
  • Biggest m/m declines: infants’/toddlers’ apparel (-26.5% annualized), fresh fruits & veggies; women’s apparel; Lodging away from home.
  • Biggest m/m outliers: Motor Fuel (+152.3% annualized), Fuel Oil, Processed Fruits & Veggies; Motor Vehicle Insurance.
  • My estimate of median CPI is actually 0.28% m/m and 2.46% y/y. But…
  • …but the median category this month may be affected by regional housing, and I don’t have the BLS factors. So grain of salt needed.
  • This summarizes the inflation story. Rents and Services ex-rents both rising ~3%. Core goods is the anchor.


Discussion: after last month’s surprising m/m core CPI print of +0.07%, many were questioning whether that was the outlier, or whether the +0.29% and +0.28% of January and February were the outliers. The answer might be that they are all outliers, as this month’s print was very close to the 4-month average. But even so, +0.2% m/m would produce a 2.4% core inflation number by the year’s end. That’s consistent with what we are being told by Median inflation. Both figures would suggest core PCE, after all of the temporary effects are removed, is essentially at or slightly above the Fed’s 2% target.

There are two pertinent questions at this juncture. The first is whether the Fed will feel any urgency to raise rates more quickly because of this data. The answer to that, I think, is clearly “no.” This Federal Reserve’s reaction function seems to be overly (and overtly) tilted towards growth indicators – and even more than that, their forecast of growth indicators. The majority of the Committee also believes that inflation expectations are “anchored” and so inflation can’t really move higher very quickly. They only pay lip service to inflation concerns, and honestly they aren’t even very good at the lip service.

The second question is where inflation goes next. Whether the Federal Reserve raises the target overnight rate or not, the question of inflation is relevant for markets. And the indicators seem to be fairly clear: the larger and more persistent categories are seeing price increases of around 3% or more, while the main drag comes from a “core goods” component that is highly influenced by the lagged effect of dollar strength (see chart, source Bloomberg).


Recently, the dollar has been weakening marginally but still is in a broad uptrend (looking at the broad, trade-weighted dollar). But if the buck merely goes flat, core goods will start to move higher. And that means even if core services remain steady, core inflation should push towards 3% later this year.

This doesn’t sound like much but it would be highly significant (and surprising) for many observers, investors, and consumers. Core inflation has not been above 3% for two decades (see chart, source Bloomberg).


This means – incredibly – that many students in college today have never seen core inflation above 3%, and more importantly many investors have not seen core inflation above 3% during their investment lives. When core inflation breaches that level, it will feel like hyperinflation to some people! And I do not think markets will like it.

A Broken Clock That is Persistently Wrong

Durable goods orders, ex-transportation, showed a negative print today for the second time in a row. This was expected, in most senses of the word, but while I don’t put too much weight on short-term wiggles in Durables it is hard to ignore the fact that the year/year change in Durables has now been negative for more than a year (see chart, source Bloomberg).


So the weakness in Durables is not new. But it bears noting that the last time core Durables went negative, in August 2012, the Fed followed with QE3 almost immediately. To be sure, at the time core inflation was all the way down at 1.9%, whereas today it is a heady 2.2%…

Look, any Fed watcher right now is and should be confused. Conditions which provoked QE just four years ago are now apparently spurring a tightening bias. Bill Gross can be excused for thinking that the Fed will go back to the old playbook and employ new QE, as he apparently did in his latest Investment Outlook – it is harder to excuse his saying that the Fed should drop money, given that it hasn’t worked yet.

But clearly, something is different in the way the central bank is approaching monetary policy. After all, nothing about this weakness is new. As noted, Durables have been negative on a year-over-year basis for a full year, and the Citi Economic Surprise index shows that economists have managed to be surprised on the negative side for an unprecedented fifteen months in a row (see chart, source Bloomberg).


Okay, the index technically turned positive once or twice for a day or two, but this is still the longest run of persistently optimistic errors that economists have had in a very long time. So this isn’t new – the economy is weak.

Unless…unless what is different is that in 2012, economists were pessimistic (the Citi Economic Surprise index turned positive right before the Fed started QE, which means that either the data was too strong or economists were too negative) whereas today they are more generally optimistic? It would be entirely consistent with how the Fed has been run for the last couple of decades if monetary policy was not being guided by actual data, but by forecasts of data. (See my book for more on monetary policy errors!)

Evidence is pretty clear that recently economists as a whole have not only been wrong, but wrong in a biased way, which is much worse. If you are merely a bad shot, you miss the target in all kinds of directions. But if you persistently miss the target in one direction, then it may well be that your weapon sights are not properly calibrated. The first sort of unbiased miss is not as dangerous, even if too much confidence is placed on the shot, because the errors will even out over time. You might eventually hit the target, by accident. But if the target sights are biased, then you will never hit the target until you realize you’re wrong. You would be tightening when you should be easing. A broken clock is right twice per day, but only if it is stopped and not just systematically two hours off.

Now, regular readers of these columns will understand that I don’t think the Fed should be easing. I don’t think the Fed can fix what ails growth, since monetary policy only affects the price variable, and easy money has only created the conditions for the inflationary upswing we are currently experiencing (Gross also acknowledges this, but sees the inflationary upswing somewhere in the unthreatening future while in fact it is here now). The Fed should have eschewed QE2 and QE3, and have long since begun to drain excess reserves. But what I think the Fed should do and forecasting what I think they will do are two very different things.

I suspect Gross is close to right. Absent some recovery in the real economy – something other than payrolls, which as we know lag – it strikes me as unlikely the Fed will be hiking rates again. Ironically, that may help keep inflation leashed for longer since it will help keep monetary velocity constrained – but I am not confident of that, given how low interest rates already are. Since inflation is very unlikely to wane any time soon, I think we are more likely to see the yield curve steepen from these levels, rather than flatten. A yield curve inversion is not a prerequisite for recession. Inverted yield curves tend to precede recessions only because the Fed is typically slow to lower interest rates in response to obvious weakness. In this case, rates are already low and the Fed isn’t likely to raise them and force a curve inversion. Yield curve inversions are not causal! This next recession may catch some people wrong-footed because they keep waiting for the inversion that never comes.

In my next article, I am going to revisit an issue I first addressed a couple of years ago and which might be especially relevant as recession possibilities increase: the question of how we can have both deflation and inflation, and how these concepts are often confused by those people who are stuck in the nominal world.

Old Age

April 8, 2016 7 comments

In yesterday’s article, I neglected to mention one remark by a former Fed chair that bothered me at the time. However, I didn’t mention it because I thought the reason it bothered me was that it was vacuous – the sort of throw-away line that someone uses to stall while thinking of the real answer to the question. Since then, I’ve realized what specifically annoyed the subconscious me about the remark.

When Bernanke was asked about whether a recession is coming at some point; he glibly replied “Expansions don’t die of old age,” as if that was obvious and the questioner was being a dolt. Like so much of what Bernanke says, this statement is both true, and irrelevant.

Human beings, also, don’t die of old age. There is a cause of death – something causes a person to die; it isn’t that their library card of corporeality became overdue and they expired. The cause may be a heart attack, a slip-and-fall in the bathtub, cancer, pneumonia, complications from surgery, or the flu, but death is the result of a cause. It just happens that as a person gets older, the number of potential causes multiplies (a newborn rarely has a heart attack) and the number of causes that become fatal to an old person, where they would be merely inconvenient to a hale person, increases as well. As we age, parts of our bodies and immune systems weaken – and that’s where death sneaks in.

Think of those weaknesses as…let’s call them imbalances that have accumulated.

The statement that expansions don’t die of old age is literally true. Something causes them to die. It may be monetary error, but as Volcker pointed out last night in answer to a different question, there were recessions long before there was a Federal Reserve. Expansions also can die from a diminution of credit availability, from energy price spikes, from malinvestment, from an overextension of balance sheets that leads to bankruptcies…from a myriad of things that may not kill a young, vibrant expansion.

The parallel is real, and the point is that while this expansion was never very vibrant the current imbalances are legion. The Fed may not see them, or may believe them to be small (like Bernanke’s Fed felt about the housing bubble and Greenspan’s Fed felt about the equity bubble). But the Fed has a fantastic record on one point: they are nearly flawless at misdiagnosing a patient who is sickening.

Mount Easemore

Thursday evening’s public discussion between Fed Chairman Janet Yellen and former chairmen Volcker, Greenspan, and Bernanke – these last three in order of gravitas and effectiveness and (perhaps not unrelatedly) reverse order of academic accomplishment – was a first. Never before, apparently, have four current and former Fed chairmen appeared on the same stage. This is less amazing than it seems: prior to Alan Greenspan it was the practice of the Federal Reserve to remain out of the limelight.

Honestly, we all probably would have been better off had they stayed there.

Still, it was a fascinating event. The International House, which hosted the event, called it the “Fabulous Four Fed chairs,” but since they did not serve contemporaneously a better image is probably Mount Rushmore…if Mount Rushmore had the faces by Nixon, Hoover, Carter, and Andrew Johnson instead of Washington, Lincoln, Teddy Roosevelt, and Thomas Jefferson.

Okay, all bond guys have a soft spot for Paul Volcker, who was the last Fed Chairman to try monetarism and managed to break the back of inflation using its common-sense prescription. But he should have stayed retired. The Volcker Rule has sucked a tremendous amount of liquidity out of the market (in conjunction with other Dodd-Frank rules) and is clearly a stain on his resumé.

Everyone was hoping that this collection of experienced policymakers would give us some clear consensus about what the Fed should do now – raise rates as per the original path that was implied? Raise rates more slowly? Maintain rates? Keep on adding liquidity? Instead, there was almost nothing useful to be gleaned from the conversation. The three ex-chairmen seemed to be competing to make the funniest statement (some intentionally, and some unintentionally like Bernanke’s statement that “unwinding the balance sheet is very straightforward”) without saying anything constructive, challenging, or even useful about current and future Fed policy; Yellen seemed to want to say useful things but it isn’t clear she has anything useful to say.

One overwhelming consensus was that the economy is doing just fine, but isn’t a “bubble economy.” Volcker did allow that “there are aspects of the financial world that are overextended.” Oh, do you think so? Maybe something like the chart below, which is an updated version of Figure 9.7 from my book?

fig9-7I guess that might be considered overextended.

Here are two other interesting snippets:

  • Bernanke, asked “how will you unwind” the extraordinary measures he instituted, wisecracked “Fortunately, I don’t have to,” which considering the scale of what he did is a clever witticism that I am sure Dr. Yellen appreciated. After expressing, as I noted earlier, that unwinding is really easy, he pointed out languidly that the Fed’s balance sheet, relative to GDP, is “about the same size of most other central banks.” Does he really think no one was paying attention since 2008? The reason all central banks have huge balance sheets is that the Fed did it first and they all followed. If you consider “most other central banks” to include others throughout history…no, it’s not even close.
  • Yellen didn’t address the elephant in the room, but went so far to pat its rump and then pretend it wasn’t there. She described the criteria the Fed had had for the December increase in interest rates (substantial progress towards employment goal, and inflation heading back up), but didn’t feel like explaining that when even more progress had been made on employment, and inflation was even higher, at the next two meetings the Fed decided to pass. She noted that “headwinds” in the “legacy of the financial crisis” and “weak global growth” meant that “the neutral rate is very low,” but unless that neutral rate happens to be 0.25%-0.50% such a comment begs the question. Those headwinds haven’t gotten any worse since December! As such, she left completely unanswered the $64,000 question[1] which is “what the heck would make you tighten again?”

In short, all of these notable central bankers (which is a little like saying “these notable hobos”) seemed to agree that everything is just fine and there is no urgency with respect to anything right now. I’ve spent the last quarter-century deciphering three of these four speakers, and I must say I can’t decide whether “everything is fine” means “the Fed can go ahead and tighten now, because everything is fine,” or “there’s no reason for the Fed to tighten now, because easing forever doesn’t seem to be a problem.”[2]

So, markets remain suspended from the pendulum of complacency, which right now seems to be quite a bit on the “complacent” side but will, I suspect, shortly swing the other way to “disturbed and uncomfortable”. I must say that nothing I heard tonight suggests further Fed tightening is imminent. However, that point in itself makes me disturbed and uncomfortable and at some point the market will oscillate around to that view – perhaps next Thursday when I think there is a good chance that core CPI rises to 2.4% y/y.

Administrative Note: On Friday at 4pm ET, I will be on Bloomberg TV’s “What’d You Miss?” with Joe Weisenthal, Alix Steel, and Scarlet Fu.

[1] In keeping with my usual tilt to keep focused on inflation and real values, it should be noted that the $64,000 question would today be the $523,277 question. The quiz show ended in November 1958 with the CPI price index at 29; it is now at 237.111.

[2] Interestingly, this last point directly echoes some of Keynes’ points in the General Theory. I will revisit that point next week.

Categories: Federal Reserve

Wage Growth Tracker – Wage Inflation is Already here

April 4, 2016 2 comments

(**Administrative Note: Get your copy of my new book What’s Wrong with Money: The Biggest Bubble of All! Here is the Amazon link).

I am often critical of central banks these days, and especially the Federal Reserve. But that doesn’t mean I think the entire institution is worthless. While quite often the staff at the Fed puts out papers that use convoluted and inscrutable mathematics to “prove” something that only works because the assumptions used are garbage, there are also occasionally good bits of work that come out. While it is uneven, I find that the Atlanta Fed’s “macroblog” often has good content, and occasionally has a terrific insight.

The latest macroblog post may fall into the latter category. Before I talk about the post, however, let me as usual admonish readers to remember that wages follow inflation; they do not lead or cause inflation. That reminder is very important to keep in mind, along with the realization that some policymakers do think that wages lead inflation and so don’t get worried about inflation until wages rise as well.

With that said, John Robertson and Ellyn Terry at the Atlanta Fed published this great macroblog article in which they present the Atlanta Fed’s Wage Growth Tracker. Here’s the summary of what they say: most wage surveys have significant composition effects, since the group of people whose wages you are surveying now are very different from the group you surveyed last year. Thus, measures like Average Hourly Wages from the Employment report (which has been rising, but not alarmingly so) are very noisy and moreover might miss important trends because, say, high-wage people are retiring and being replaced by low-wage people (or industries).

But the Atlanta Fed’s Wage Growth Tracker estimates the wage growth of the same worker’s wage versus a year ago. That is, they avoid the composition effect.

It turns out that the Wage Growth Tracker has been rising much more steadily and at a higher rate than average hourly earnings. Here is the drop-the-mic chart:

6a00d8341c834f53ef01b8d1b8a62d970c-500wiThis shows that the wage-growth tracker follows the unemployment gap (lagged 6 months) very well: with a correlation of 0.93, actually. Moreover, the wage growth tracker is (and has been) over 3%.

With this data, the Phillips curve works like a charm. Higher employment is not only related, but closely related to higher wage growth. (For the record, Phillips never said that broad inflation was related to the unemployment rate. He said wage inflation was. See my post on the topic here.) The good news is that this doesn’t really say anything about future inflation, and what it means is that the worker who is actually employed right now is still keeping pace with inflation (barely) thanks to relatively strong employment dynamics.

The bad news, for Yellen and the other doves on the FOMC, is that if they were hiding behind the “tepid wage growth” argument as a reason to be suspicious that inflation will not be maintained, the Atlanta Fed just took a weed-whacker to their argument.

“You Want ANOTHER Hike? Already?”

(**Administrative Note: Get your copy of my new book What’s Wrong with Money: The Biggest Bubble of All! Here is the Amazon link.)

I was surprised in December when the most dovish central banker ever to lead the Fed allowed the body to implement a tightening, so perhaps I shouldn’t be surprised now that she is staunchly resisting an increasingly-raucous chorus of hawks. Prior to the Fed’s last meeting, I noted that if there was ever an excuse for tightening, unemployment being around 5% with core CPI above 2% while emergency measures still remain in place from the last crisis was probably a pretty good one. When the Fed eschewed action at the meeting, I scratched my head even though I wasn’t totally shocked. Yellen is a dove, and an unrepentant one at that. Despite all efforts to rehabilitate her image in that regard, the truth remains.

But her arguments are getting increasingly weak. Her argument seems to be that if domestic growth is weak, then even if inflation is rising the Fed will maintain the extraordinary measures as long as inflation is not yet at disturbing levels, or if the inflation is believed to be transient. Okay, fair enough – I believe it’s the wrong tine of the fork to focus on, since in the long run growth is maximized when inflation is low, stable, and predictable (as Greenspan once was fond of reminding us) and because the Fed can actually control inflation through monetary policy while there is little evidence they can control real growth. But still, it’s a point that many at the Federal Reserve would agree with.

However, in her remarks on Tuesday Yellen went further and pointed to weakness in other parts of the world where the Fed clearly has no direct mandate but also where it isn’t clear the weakness isn’t a net positive for the US in terms of our growth/inflation tradeoff. Lower energy prices due to weak growth in Europe and China, for example, has a positive impact on the United States which almost certainly outweighs the decline in our exports to those countries.

Yellen’s argument sounds a lot like what you will sometimes hear around bonus time at a large company (and perhaps here I will reveal lingering frustrations of my own!). In some companies, what you hear at bonus time if your group or your particular project did really well is “you did well, but we can’t pay you as much as it deserves because the firm/the division/the group came in below plan.” At the same organization, if your group or your project did poorly while the overall firm had a banner year, the bonus time discussion will begin with “well, as you know you didn’t perform well…”

Growth will always be weak somewhere in the world. Soon enough, it will probably be weak here. But even when it weakens here it is not likely to be so weak that we continue to need extraordinary liquidity provision such as that which is currently in place.

Yes: to me, the bigger issue is the size of the Fed’s balance sheet and the global pile of excess reserves. Higher interest rates from the central bank are not only not a cure, they make the problem worse by causing money velocity to increase. But I would be somewhat less uncomfortable if there was any indication that the Fed had some sense of urgency on the inflation front.

In any event, if the Fed does not raise rates in April then it means it will be at least 6 months between 25bp rate increases. At that rate, it would be about six years until the short rate returned to something like a normal level. But that’s irrelevant – because a change in rates every six months cannot be seriously called a tightening “campaign.”

The Fed’s credibility erodes further with every passing day. The good news is that there isn’t much left to erode.

Categories: Federal Reserve

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