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Inflation-Linked Bonds: For the Wary, but the “Wise?”

Only a quick article at the moment. This is longer than a tweet-length answer, but didn’t need to be super long.

A friend sent me the link to the following article from the FT:

Will UK inflation-linked bonds be the choice of the wise?

I must confess I don’t know about the answer to that question, although it is true that UK linkers – especially long linkers – are perennially rich thanks to pension fund demand. Below is a chart (source: Enduring Investments) that shows our analytical rich/cheap series for 10-year UK linkers.

But the article also includes a common gripe about inflation-linked bonds that isn’t really fair, and should be addressed. The argument is that inflation-linked bonds don’t really protect against inflation, because changes in real yields are much more impactful to the return than are changes in inflation.

This is true. It is also true that changes in nominal yields are much more impactful to the return of nominal bonds than is the coupon rate or yield on the bond. If you buy a 10-year Treasury yielding, say, 3%, and hold it for two years, you will most likely get a return quite a bit different from 3% because changes in the yield-to-maturity over that period overwhelms the yield of the bond (especially now). You only get 3% if you hold to maturity. (Well, technically you get 3% if you hold for a period equal to the Macaulay duration, but that’s a discussion for another time.)

So it isn’t fair to criticize inflation-linked bonds for not being an inflation hedge over every time period. As with nominal bonds, they are a perfect inflation hedge if held to the proper horizon, and a less-than-perfect hedge over different time periods.

However, you shouldn’t be trying to hedge inflation over the next week or month. You should be trying to hedge inflation over the long term. Accordingly, the fact that returns vary due to changes in real yields is not a damning fact about linkers. Unless, of course, you’re a highly levered participant.

Categories: Bond Market, Quick One, Theory, TIPS, UK

Inflation Trading is Not for the Weak

June 27, 2017 1 comment

I was prepared today to write a column about horse racing and value investing…that will have to wait until tomorrow…when this article was sent to me by about a dozen people:

Deutsche Bank Said to Face Possible $60 Million Derivative Loss

The article was sent my way because the loss was tied to a trade that used US dollar inflation derivatives, and since that’s a market I basically started back in 2003 folks figured I might want to know. And I do.

The inflation derivatives market is not huge. The chart below shows rolling 12-month inflation derivative volumes (source: BGC Partners) through last September, which was the last time I went looking for the data for a presentation. Total interbank volumes are around $10-15bln per month; customer volumes are not included here but are not insignificant (any more).

Most inflation books, especially these Volcker Rule days, are run pretty close to the vest. Most of these volumes will be set against customer flows, or against bond breakevens, or against other positions on the inflation curve. Net risk positions for any derivative book, especially these days, are pretty small…which is why Deutsche is investigating whether risk limits were breached in this case. In principle this should be easy to figure out, since DB and every other bank has risk control specialists whose job it is to monitor these risks.

But inflation risks are complex. Our firm breaks fixed-income risks down into six basis risks that add up to the net risk of a bond. For a TIPS bond, there is just one risk; for a corporate bond there will be six. Our risk schematic starts from real rate risks and builds up – unlike in most risk systems, which start with nominal risks and try to force real bonds to fit. Inflation-linked derivatives also have commodity deltas implied, since they are tied to headline inflation and headline inflation is tied largely to energy prices. Geez, I could write a book on this – it would be a combination of “Inflation Risks and Products[1] and, in this case, “Financial Shenanigans: How to Detect Accounting Gimmicks & Fraud in Financial Reports.”

Suffice it to say that even really sharp investors don’t always quite get it when it comes to inflation. In early 2014, a prestigious investment management firm took a multi-billion-dollar bath on a “risk-parity” product that hadn’t truly understood how to figure out the risks of TIPS. How much more difficult, then, is it for risk control officers, many of whom have shiny new Ph.D.s and very little direct market experience? A fast-talking trader who knows something about the product can, if he is unscrupulous, persuade risk control that he is not really taking risks that he knows, or ought to know, he is taking.

In short, I am sympathetic with the risk control guys in this case. They were probably outgunned by a slick operator pushing the limits of his limits. It’s almost assuredly the case: the market, as large as it is, is too small in the Volcker Rule era to allow the accumulation of a prudent position of large enough size to cause this sort of loss – especially in the recent period of exceptionally low market volatility.

This, then, is an object lesson: if you’re running inflation risk, and you think it’s pretty much like running nominal rate risk – you’re wrong, and you should get help before your firm’s name is the one in the Bloomberg article.[2]

Tomorrow, we can talk about horse racing.

[1] In which I co-wrote a chapter, on commodities actually, with Bob Greer.

[2] To be fair, in this case the problem was the combination of ignorance and what appears to be malfeasance. If you’re careful with your control structures and only hire high-quality people of sterling reputation, you shouldn’t have a problem with the second part of this formula.

Categories: Bond Market, TIPS, Trading

Bond Vigilantes Still Slumber

I read an article recently that noted the 65-75bp rise in Treasury yields over the last year or so, and sought to explain, through a labyrinthine line of reasoning/model, that most of the rise was due to the “reflationary” trade, with the Fed hopelessly behind the curve. The model the author used depicted inflation expectations as being fairly directly tied to the rise in inflation outcomes that we’ve seen: headline inflation has risen from below 1% at the middle of last year to 2.4% year-over-year ended last month.

This approach was, at one time, fairly standard. Since there was no way to directly observe inflation expectations, people measured real rates by taking current interest rates and subtracting trailing 1-year inflation, reasoning that recent inflation is a good proxy for expectations. Indeed, you will still see some economists and bloggers referring to the “recent decline in real rates” that has happened since headline inflation has risen about 250bps since mid-2015 (see chart, source Bloomberg) while 10-year rates are approximately unchanged over the same time horizon.

With this framework, economists would say that real interest rates have fallen precipitously and are now roughly zero, whereas two years ago they were over 2%.

Of course, that old way of doing things is nonsense today. Because past inflation is highly influenced by changes in energy prices (oil prices bottomed in early 2016), trailing inflation is in fact a pretty poor measure of longer-term inflation expectations, and we no longer need to rely on this method because we can directly observe real interest rates, and to some extent market measures of inflation expectations.[1] Here are the current levels, along with 1-year and 2-year changes, in real rates and inflation over the last one and two years (source: Bloomberg; Enduring Investments calculations):

So what has really happened to longer-term real rates and inflation expectations? Over the last two years, 10-year real yields have risen about 27bps, with roughly unchanged 10-year inflation expectations, producing a 25bp rise in nominal interest rates. Over the last year, those numbers are +38bps and +27bps, leading to a 65bp rise in 10-year nominal yields.

Those figures give the central bank tremendous credit for not being behind the curve. Over the last two years, core and median inflation has risen 0.3% while 10-year expectations have been stable. Over the last year, core inflation has fallen a bit (though that has a lot to do with the quirky plunge in telecom prices last month, which should be reversed this month) while median has risen about 10bps. Still, there’s no panic at all in inflation markets. Real yields have risen only 16-65bps over the last two years, despite 75bps of rate hikes.

The Fed very probably is well behind the curve, but the market doesn’t think so. The bond vigilantes haven’t even begun to light their torches yet.

[1] Since market nominal interest rates are lower than they would be if the Fed had not bought a few trillion in securities, breakevens and inflation swaps are probably lower than true inflation expectations would be if the market was freely trading, but since at some point market rates will begin to anticipate the unwind of the Fed’s balance sheet we can’t really say for sure.

Categories: Federal Reserve, TIPS

A (Very) Long History of Real Interest Rates

December 23, 2016 3 comments

One of the problems that inflation folks have is that the historical data series for many of the assets we use in our craft are fairly short, low-quality, or difficult to obtain. Anything in real estate is difficult: farmland, timber, commercial real estate. Even many commodities futures only go back to the early 1980s. But the really frustrating absence is the lack of a good history of real interest rates (interest rates on inflation-linked bonds). The UK has had inflation-linked bonds since the early 1980s, but the US didn’t launch TIPS until 1997 and most other issuers of ILBs started well after that.

This isn’t just a problem for asset-allocation studies, although it is that. The lack of a good history of real interest rates is problematic to economists and financial theoreticians as well. These practitioners have been forced to use sub-optimal “solutions” instead. One popular method of creating a past history of “real interest rates” is to use a nominal interest rate and adjust it by current inflation. This is obvious nonsense. A 10-year nominal interest rate consists of 10-year real interest rates and 10-year forward inflation expectations. The assumption – usually explicit in studies of this kind – is that “investors assume the next ten years of inflation will be the same as the most-recent year’s inflation.”

We now have plenty of data to prove that isn’t how expectations work – and, not to mention, a complete curve of real interest rates given by TIPS yields – but it is still a popular way for lazy economists to talk about real rates. Here is what the historical record looks like if you take 10-year Treasury rates and deflate them by trailing 1-year inflation:

dumbrealThis is ridiculously implausible volatility for 10-year real rates, and a range that is unreasonable. Sure, nominal rates were very high in the early 1980s, but 10%? And can it be that real rates – the cost of 10-year money, adjusted for forward inflation expectations – were -4.6% in 1980 and +9.6% in 1984? This hypothetical history is clearly so unlikely as to be useless.

In 2000, Jay Shanken and S.P. Kothari wrote a paper called “Asset Allocation with Conventional and Indexed Bonds.” To make this paper possible, they had to back-fill returns from hypothetical inflation-linked bonds. Their method was better than the method mentioned above, but still produced an unreasonably volatile stream. The chart below shows a series, in red, that is derived from their series of hypothetical annual real returns on 5-year inflation-indexed bonds, and backing into the real yields implied by those returns. I have narrowed the historical range to focus better on the range of dates in the Shanken/Kothari paper.

skreal

You can see the volatility of the real yield series is much more reasonable, but still produces a very high spike in the early 1980s.

The key to deriving a smarter real yield series lies in this spike in the early 1980s. We need to understand that what drives very high nominal yields, such as we had at that time in the world, is not real yields. Since the real yield is essentially the real cost of money it should not ever be much higher than real potential economic growth. Very high nominal yields are, rather, driven by high inflation expectations. If we look at the UK experience, we can see from bona fide inflation-linked bonds that in the early 1980s real yields were not 10%, but actually under 5% despite those very high nominal yields. Conversely, very low interest rates tend to be caused by very pessimistic real growth outcomes, while inflation expectations behave as if there is some kind of floor.

We at Enduring Investments developed some time ago a model that describes realistically how real yields evolve given nominal yields. We discovered that this model fits not only the UK experience, but every developed country that has inflation-linked bonds. Moreover, it accurately predicted how real yields would behave when nominal yields fell below 2% as they did in 2012…even though yields like that were entirely out-of-sample when we developed the model. I can’t describe the model in great detail because the method is proprietary and is used in some of our investment approaches. But here is a chart of the Enduring Investments real yield series, with the “classic” series in blue and the “Shanken/Kothari” series in red:

endreal

This series has a much more reasonable relationship to the interest rate cycle and to nominal interest rates specifically. Incidentally, when I sat down to write this article I hadn’t ever looked at our series calculated that far back before, and hadn’t noticed that it actually fits a sine curve very well. Here is the same series, with a sine wave overlaid. (The wave has a frequency of 38 years and an amplitude of 2.9% – I mention this for the cycle theorists.)

endrealsine

This briefly excited me, but I stress briefly. It’s interesting but merely coincidental. When we extend this back to 1871 (using Shiller data) there is still a cycle but the amplitude is different.

endreallong

So what is the implication of this chart? There is nothing predictive here; about all that we can (reasonably) say is what we already knew: real yields are not just low, but historically low. (Current 10-year TIPS yields are higher than our model expects them to be, but not by as much as they were earlier this  year thanks to a furious rally in breakevens.) Money is historically cheap – again, we knew this – in a way it hasn’t been since the War effort when nominal interest rates were fixed by the Fed even though wartime inflation caused expectations to rise. With real yields that low, how did the war effort get funded? Who in the world lent money at negative real interest rates like banks awash in cash do today?

That’s right…patriots.

1986-004-223Frankly, that makes a lot more sense than the reason we have low real interest rates today!

Categories: Good One, Investing, Theory, TIPS

Add Another Uncomfortable First for Stocks

December 15, 2016 3 comments

It hasn’t happened yet, but it is about to.

Not since just before the financial crisis has the expected 10-year real return from stocks been below the 10-year TIPS yield. But with TIPS selling off and stocks rallying, the numbers are virtually the same: both stocks, and TIPS, have an expected real return of about 0.70% per annum for the next 10 years.

A quick word about my method is appropriate because some analysts will consider this spread to already be negative. I use a method similar to that used by Arnott, Grantham, and other well-known ‘value’ investors: I add the dividend yield for equities to an estimate of long-run real economic growth, and then assume that cyclical multiples pull two-thirds of the way back to the long-run value, over ten years. (By comparison, Grantham assumes that multiples fully mean-revert, over seven years, so he will see stocks as even more expensive than I do – but the important point is that the method doesn’t change over time).

Somewhat trickier is the calculation of 10-year real yields before 1997, when TIPS were first issued. But we have a way to do that as well – a method much better than the old-fashioned approach of taking current ten-year yields and subtracting trailing 1-year inflation (used by many notables, including such names as Fama). That only matters because the chart I am about to show goes back to 1956, and so I know someone would ask where I got 10 year real yields prior to 1997.

The chart below (Source: Enduring Investments) shows the “real equity premium” – the expected real return of stocks, compared to the true risk-free asset at a 10-year horizon: 10-year TIPS.

realequityprem

The good news is that in this sense, stocks are not as expensive relatively as they were in the late 1990s, nor as expensive (although much closer) relatively as they were prior to the global financial crisis. Nor even as they were (although even closer) just prior to the 1987 stock market crash. Yay.

The bad news is that they are every bit as expensive as they were in early 1973, just before the ten-year bear market that was, in real terms, every bit as bad as the 2000-2009 bear market. From 1973 to mid-1982, stocks lost roughly 60% of their value in real terms – just about what they lost in real terms between 2000 and 2009. The chart below (Source: Bloomberg) shows the S&P 500 divided by CPI, on a log scale so you can see the similar percentage moves.

realsp

The parallels with 1999 don’t scare me. There isn’t the same exuberance over companies with no earnings[1] and “new world” “new paradigm” chatterings. But the parallels with the late 1960s/early 1970s frighten me quite a bit more. The hippies are out protesting, and everything! The interest rate cycle in 1973 had already long-since bottomed, as had core inflation – although in 1972 and 1973 inflation had actually come back down from the Vietnam War-induced bump of the late 1960s. In 2016, we also face an interest rate cycle that has turned, and core inflation that bottomed more than six years ago. In 1973, a Republican President had just been (re-)elected and stocks rallied into the inauguration. And that, my friends, was that. Poor central bank policy – encouraged by a certain Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers named Alan Greenspan – ensured that even when stocks bottomed in nominal terms in 1974, they continued to lose value to accelerating inflationary dynamics.

I could go on, but these are merely my own qualms. The quantitative fact, and not the story, is what matters: stocks now no longer offer an expectation of return in excess of the risk-free return. They may keep rallying for years since the US dollar is the high-yielding currency and money needs to go somewhere, but we are into the realm of speculative finance. For a while, the argument for stocks was “sure, they’re expensive, but with yields this low they are still relatively better.” They’re no longer even relatively better.

[1] With the exception of Tesla.

Categories: Stock Market, TIPS

Why Are Inflation Expectations Rising?

November 2, 2016 5 comments

A persistent phenomenon of the last couple of months has been the rise in inflation expectations, in particular market-based measures. The chart below (source: Bloomberg) shows that 10-year inflation swap quotes are now above 2% for the first time in over a year and up about 25-30bps since the end of summer.

usswit10

The same chart shows that inflation expectations remain far below the levels of 2014, 2013, and…well, actually the levels since 2004, with the exception of the crisis. This is obviously not a surprise per se, since I’ve been beating the drum for months, nay quarters, that breakevens are too low and TIPS too cheap relative to nominals. But why is this happening now? I can think of five solid reasons that market-based measures of inflation expectations are rising, and likely will continue to rise for some time.

  • Inflation itself is rising. What is really amazing to me – and I’ve written about it before! – is that 10-year inflation expectations can be so low when actual levels of inflation are considerably above 2%. While headline inflation oscillates all the time, thanks to volatile energy (and to a lesser extent, food) markets, the middle of the inflation distribution has been moving steadily higher. Median inflation (see chart, source Bloomberg) is over 2.5%. Core inflation is 2.2%. “Sticky” inflation is 2.6%.

medcpia

Moreover, as has been exhaustively documented here and elsewhere, these slow-moving measures of persistent inflationary pressures have been rising for more than two years, and have been over the current 2% level of 10-year inflation swaps since 2011. At the same time inflation expectations have been declining. So why are inflation expectations rising? One answer is that investors are now recognizing the likelihood that the inflation dynamic has changed and inflation is not going to abruptly decelerate any time soon.

  • It is also worth pointing out, as I did last December in this article, that the inflation markets overreact to energy price movements. Some of this recovery in inflation quotes is just unwinding the overreaction to the energy swoon, now that oil quotes are rising again. To be sure, I don’t think oil prices are going to continue to rise, but all they have to do is to level off and inflation swap quotes (and TIPS breakevens) will continue to recover.
  • Inflation tail risk is coming back. This is a little technical, but bear with me. If your best-guess is that inflation over the next 10 years will average 2%, and the distribution of your expectations around that number is normal, then the fair value for the inflation swap is also 2%. But, if the length of the tail of “outliers” is longer to the high side than to the low side, then fair value will be above 2% even though you think 2% is the “most likely” figure. As it turns out, inflation outcomes are not at all normal, and in fact demonstrate long tails to the upside. The chart below is of the distribution of overlapping 1-year inflation rates going back 100 years. You can see the mode of the distribution is between 2%-4%…but there is a significant upper tail as well. The lower tail is constrained – deflation never goes to -12%; if you get deflation it’s a narrow thing. But the upper tail can go very high.

longtailsWhen inflation quotes were very low, it may have partly been because investors saw no chance of an inflationary accident. But it is hard to look at what has been happening to inflation over the last couple of years, and the extraordinary monetary policy actions of the last decade, and not conclude that there is a possibility – even a small possibility – of a long upside tail. As with options valuation, even an improbable event can have an important impact on the price, if the significance of the event is large. And any nonzero probability of double-digit inflation should raise the equilibrium price of inflation quotes.

  • The prices that are changing the most right now are highly salient. Inflation expectations are inordinately influenced, as noted above, by the price of energy. This is not only true in the inflation markets, but in forming the expectations of individual consumers. Gasoline, while it is a relatively small part of the consumption basket, has high salience because it is a purchase that is made frequently, and as a purchase unto itself (rather than just one more item in the basket at the supermarket), and its price is in big numbers on every corner. But it is not just gasoline that is moving at the moment. Also having high salience, although it moves much less frequently for most consumers: medical care. No consumer can fail to notice the screams of his fellow consumers when the insurance letter shows up in the mail explaining how the increase in insurance premiums will be 20%, 40%, or more. While I do not believe that an “expectations anchoring” phenomenon is important to inflation dynamics, there are many who do. And those people must be very nervous because the movement of several very salient consumption items is exactly the sort of thing that might unanchor those expectations.
  • Inflation markets were too low anyway. When 10-year inflation swaps dipped below 1.50% earlier this year, it was ridiculous. With actual inflation over 2% and rising, someone going short inflation markets at 1.50% had to assess a reasonable probability of an extended period of core-price disinflation taking hold after the first couple of years of inflation over 2%. By our proprietary measure, TIPS this year have persistently been 80-100bps too cheap (see chart, source Enduring Investments). This is a massive amount. The only times TIPS have been cheaper, relative to nominal bonds, were in the early days when institutions were not yet investing in TIPS, and in the teeth of the global financial crisis when one defaulting dealer was forced to blow out of a massive inventory of them. We have never seen TIPS as cheap as this in an environment of at least acceptable liquidity.

tipscheap

So, why did breakevens rally? Among the other reasons, they rallied because they were ridiculously too low. They’re still ridiculously too low, but not quite as ridiculously too low.

What happens next? Well, I look at that list and I see no reason that TIPS shouldn’t continue to outperform nominal bonds for a while since none of those factors looks to be exhauster. That doesn’t mean TIPS will rally – indeed, real yields are ridiculously low and I don’t love TIPS on their own. But, relative to nominal Treasuries (which impound the same real rate expectation), it’s not even a close call.

Not Enough TIPS to Go Around

June 14, 2016 2 comments

Some days – well, on days like today, and for the last few days – it seems like there are far too many TIPS. Although energy has slipped only mildly, and (let’s not forget!) core and median inflation are both over 2% and rising, today ten-year breakeven inflation fell to only 1.48%, the lowest level since early March (see chart, source Bloomberg).

panickybei

The panicky-feeling downtrade is exacerbated by the thin risk budgets on the Street in inflation trading. From an investment standpoint, with inflation over the next few years highly likely to exceed the current breakeven rate (unless energy prices go to zero, or median inflation and wages abruptly reverse their multi-year accelerations), investors who buy TIPS in preference to nominal Treasuries (which is the bet you’re putting on in a breakeven trade, but works from a long-only perspective as well) are likely to outperform unless US inflation comes in below, say, 1.25% for the seven years starting in three years. And even if inflation does come in below that, the underperformance will be slight in comparison to the potential outperformance if inflation rises from its current level. TIPS don’t continue to underperform worse and worse in deflationary outcomes; their principal amounts are guaranteed in nominal terms.

But that doesn’t help at times like these. We have to remember, core inflation has been below 3% for twenty years. There are people in college today who have never seen core inflation with a 3-handle, and a generation of investors who have never had to factor the possibility of higher inflation into their calculations. (See chart, source Bloomberg).

corebelow3

If that seems incredible, then consider that it may be even more incredible to ignore inflation-linked bonds at these levels even if you think inflation will stay low! Core inflation has not been lower than 1.9% compounded, over a ten-year period, since the 1960s. Even trailing 10-year headline inflation, which is currently 1.73% only since Crude Oil is -35% over the last ten years (remember all of the smack talk about how the Fed should stop focusing on core inflation since energy was no longer mean-reverting?), hasn’t been as low at 1.5% for an entire decade since 1964, and hasn’t been below 1.25% since 1942.

But prices at any moment are about supply and demand, and there are about $1.27trillion in TIPS outstanding right now while investors struggle to remember what 3% inflation felt like.

I am here to tell, though, that there is a terrible shortage of TIPS.

So we know the supply number. About $1.25 trillion, and only $310bln is over 10 years in maturity. Not all of that is float, mind you – many of these bonds are held as long-term hedges by investors who know better. We don’t have to add corporate inflation-linked bonds (ILBs), municipal ILBs, or infrastructure-backed ILBs, because the aggregate outstanding of those markets is rounding error.

How about demand? Let’s tick off some of the inflation exposures that exist institutionally, which admittedly completely ignores demand by individual investors (who are also inflation-exposed by nature).

  • Total US endowment and foundation assets: ~$1 trillion as of 2013 (latest I have handy)
    • Endowments and foundations’ liabilities are almost wholly inflation-sensitive
  • Total US pension fund assets: ~$16 trillion
    • Most pension funds in the US don’t have COLAs, but they still have large exposures to inflation if they still have employees earning benefits
  • Insurance companies: exposure to inflation in 125mm workers’ compensation policies covering $6 trillion in wages, and very long-dated to boot
  • Post-employment medical (OPEB) benefits liabilities: $567bln as of 2014, for US states alone (that is, ignoring corporate OPEBs)

I will stop counting here. I didn’t have to look very hard to get inflation-linked liabilities that are a multiple of available ILB supply – and a very large multiple of long-dated ILB float. I am sure someone will complain that I left something out, or have old data, or something…but this isn’t an accounting class: I am just pointing out orders of magnitude. And, by an order of magnitude, there are not enough TIPS to go around if investors decide that inflation is a salient risk.

But if there is already such an imbalance, then why don’t TIPS trade as if there is a shortage? For the answer, we go back to the chart above. The people managing these liabilities (and you may be one!) haven’t had to worry about inflation exposure for a very long time. To the extent that savvy institutional investors buy TIPS, they dislike them because the nominal and real returns are awful. Therefore, they seek to replace these bonds with other real assets which may provide some protection if inflation rises. Among these are commodities – which are also loathed at present – as well as illiquid assets like real estate or private equity.

I have had insurance company risk managers say to me, “we cannot own enough TIPS to matter if inflation rises to a level that would concern us, because the return if inflation does not rise is so horrible. And, in fact, our hedge ratio would probably be above 100%.” I am not sure that is a great excuse to do nothing at all (and we try to help them square that circle) but I present the comment to give some notion of the mindset.

The mindset will change. It will not change overnight, probably, but when inflation exceeds 3% and then starts the assault on 4%, it will change. And then, abruptly, it will all too obvious that a trillion in TIPS doesn’t go as far as you think.

—–

(Interested in what we do? Take a look at Enduring Investments’ Crowdfunder campaign, which is open to accredited investors who are willing to be verified as accredited by a third party verification agent.)

Categories: TIPS
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