Because I write a lot about inflation – we all have our spheres of expertise, and this is mine – I am often asked about how to invest in the space. From time to time, I’ve commented on relative valuations of commodities, for example, and so people will ask how I feel about GLD, or whether USCI is better than DJP, or whether I like MOO today. I generally deflect any inquiry about my specific recommendations (years of Wall Street compliance regimes triggers a nervous tic if I even think about recommending a particular security), even though I certainly have an opinion about gold’s relative value at the moment or whether it is the right time to play an agriculture ETF.
But I don’t mind making general statements of principle, or an analytical/statistical analysis about a particular fund. For example, I am comfortable saying that in general, a broad-based commodity exposure offers a better long-term profit expectation than a single-commodity ETF, partly because of the rebalancing effect of such an index. In 2010 I opined that USCI is a smarter way to assemble a commodity index. And so on.
When it comes to inflation itself, however, the answers have been difficult because there are so few alternatives. Yes, there are dozens of TIPS funds – which are correlated each to the other at about 0.99. But even these funds and ETFs don’t solve the problem I am talking about. TIPS allow you to trade real interest rates; but when inflation expectations rise, real interest rates tend also to rise and TIPS actually lose value on a mark-to-market basis. This can be frustrating to TIPS owners who correctly identify that inflation expectations are about to rise, but lose because of the real rates exposure. What we need is a way to trade inflation expectations themselves.
When I was at Barclays, we persuaded the CME to introduce a CPI futures contract, but it was poorly constructed (my fault) and died. Inflation swaps are available, but not to non-institutional clients. Institutional investors can also trade ‘breakevens’ by buying TIPS and shorting nominal Treasuries, since the difference between the nominal yield and the real yield is inflation expectations. But individual investors cannot easily do this. So what is the alternative for these investors? Buy TIP and marry it with an inverse Treasury ETF? The difficulties of figuring (and maintaining) the hedge ratio for such a trade, and the fact that you need two dollars (and double fees) in order to buy one dollar of breakeven exposure in this fashion, makes this a poor solution.
There have been attempts to fill this need. Some years ago, Deutsche Bank launched INFL, a PowerShares ETN that was tied to an index consisting of several points on the inflation-expectations curve. That ETN is now delisted. ProShares at about the same time introduced UINF and RINF, two ETFs that tracked the 10-year breakeven and 30-year breakeven rate, respectively. UINF was delisted, and RINF struggled. I lamented this fact as recently as last March, when I observed the following:
“Unfortunately, for the non-institutional investor it is hard to be long breakevens. The CME has never re-launched CPI futures, despite my many pleadings, and most ETF products related to breakevens have been dissolved – with the notable, if marginal, exception of RINF, which tracks 30-year breakevens but has a very small float. It appears to be approximately fair, however. Other than that – your options are to be long a TIPS product and long an inverse-Treasury product, but the hedge ratios are not simple, not static, and the fees would make this unpleasant.”
And so when people asked me how to trade breakevens, when my articles would mention them, I had to shrug and share my distress with them, and say “someday!”
But recently, this started to change. As TIPS late last year awoke from their long slumber, and went from being egregiously cheap to just typical levels of cheapness (TIPS almost always are slightly cheap to fair value), the RINF ETF also woke up. The chart below shows the number of shares outstanding, in thousands, for the RINF ETF.
To be sure, RINF is still small. The float – although float is less critical in an ETF that has a liquid underlying than it is in an equity issue – is still only around $50mm. But that is up 1200% from what it was in mid-November. The bid/offer is still far too wide, so as a trading vehicle RINF is still not super useful. But for intermediate swing trading, or as a longer-term hedge for some other part of your portfolio…it’s at least available, and the increase in float is the most positive sign of growth in this area that I have seen in a while. So, if you are one of the people who has asked me this question in the past: I no longer have a fear of an imminent de-listing of RINF, and it’s worth a look.
Earlier today I was on Bloomberg<GO> when the PCE inflation figures were released. As usual, it was an enjoyable time even if Alix Steel did call me a ‘big inflation nerd’ or something to that effect.
The topic was, of course, PCE – as well as inflation in general, how the Fed might respond (or not), and what the effect of the new Administration’s policies may be. You can see the main part of the discussion here, although not the part where Alix calls me a nerd. A man has some pride.
My main point regarding the PCE report was that PCE isn’t terribly low, but rather right on the long-run average as the chart below (all charts source Bloomberg) shows. Of course, PCE has been lagging behind the rise in CPI, but because it had been “too tight” previously this isn’t yet abnormal.
However, in the interview I didn’t get to the really nerdy part. Perhaps my ego was still stinging and so I didn’t want to highlight the nerdiness? No matter. The nerdy part is that the reason PCE is low is actually no longer because of Medical Care, but because of housing. This next chart plots the spread of core CPI over core PCE, through last month’s figures, versus Owners’ Equivalent Rent (OER).
Housing has a much higher weight in the CPI than in the PCE, and as you can see the plodding nature of OER means that the correlation is somewhat persistent because housing inflation is somewhat persistent. Right now, OER (which, frankly, I thought would have leveled off by now) is rising and showing no signs of slowing, and this fact has served to widen the CPI-PCE spread back to its historical average and likely will cause it to widen to an above-average level. I suppose the good news there is that it is still true that outside of housing, core inflation is still not rising aggressively. Core services ex-housing are looking perkier, but core goods continue to languish as the dollar remains strong. The strength of the dollar almost beggars belief if it’s true that the rest of the world hates us now, but it is what it is.
The bigger point, for markets, is “so what?” There is nothing about a 1.7% core PCE that presents any urgency for Chairman Yellen. As I said on the program: as Yellen approaches the end of her chairmanship (in January 2018, since she insists Trump won’t chase her out before), I believe it is much more likely that she wants to be remembered for pushing the unemployment rate very low – because she believes inflation is easily controlled – than that she wants to be remembered for being a hawk that stopped inflation from getting going. She isn’t worried about inflation, and so the question is whether she wants to be criticized for adding “too many” jobs, or not adding enough. Not that monetary policy has much to do with that, but I believe she clearly will err on the side of keeping policy too loose. The Fed isn’t tightening this week, and I find it unlikely that they will tighten in March, unless inflation expectations rise considerably further than they have already (see chart of 5y5y inflation forward from CPI swaps, below). Even after the big rally since late last year, 5y5y is well below the long-term average through 2014.
And even if inflation expectations do rise further, the excuse from the chair will be easy: expectations are rising because the end (and possible reversal) of the globalization dividend and the imposition of tariffs will lead to higher prices. But there is nothing that Fed policy can do about this – it is a supply-side effect, just as high oil prices due to OPEC production restraints would represent a supply-side effect that the Fed shouldn’t respond to. So the excuses are all there for Dr. Yellen. History will show that she missed a chance to shrink the Fed’s balance sheet and avert the worst of the next inflationary upturn, but that history will not be written for some time.
 Ridiculous, of course. I embrace my nerdiness, at least when it comes to inflation.
Below is a summary of my post-CPI tweets. You can (and should!) follow me @inflation_guy or sign up for email updates to my occasional articles here. Investors with interests in this area be sure to stop by Enduring Investments. Plus…buy my book about money and inflation, published in March 2016. The title of the book is What’s Wrong with Money? The Biggest Bubble of All; order from Amazon here.
- Last CPI of 2016…fire it up!
- Core +0.23%, a bit higher than expected. Market was looking for 0.16% or so.
- y/y core CPI rises to 2.21%. The core print was the second highest since last Feb.
- For a change, the BLS has the full data files posted so brb with more analysis. Housing subcomponent jumped, looking now.
- Just saw this. Pretty cool. Our calculator https://www.enduringinvestments.com/calculators/cpi.php … pretty cool too but not updated instantly.
- BLS-Labor Statistics @BLS_gov: See our interactive graphics on today’s new Consumer Price Index data http://go.usa.gov/x9mMG #CPI #BLSdata #DataViz
- As I said, housing rose to 3.04% from 2.90% y/y. Primary Rents jumped to 3.96% from 3.88%; OER 3.57% from 3.54%.
- Household energy was also higher, so some of the housing jump was actually energy. But the rise in primary rents matters.
- Will come back to that. Apparel y/y slipped back into deflation (dollar effect). Recreation and Education steady. “Other” up a bit.
- In Medical Care, 4.07% vs 3.98%. That had recently retraced a bit but back on the + side. Drugs, Prof. Svcs, and Hospital Svcs all +
- Medicinal drugs. Not a new high but maybe the retracement is done.
- Core services up to 3.1% from 3.0%; core goods -0.6% vs -0.7%.
- That’s consistent with our view: stronger USD will keep core goods in or near deflation but it shouldn’t get much worse.
- The dollar is just not going to cause core deflation in the US. Import/export sector is too small.
- Core ex-housing rose to 1.20% from 1.12%. Still not exactly alarming!
- Not from this report, but wages are worrying people and here’s why:
- However, wages tend to follow inflation, not lead it. I always add that caveat. But it matters for Fed reaction function.
- Next few months are the challenge for renewed upward swing in core CPI – Jan and Feb 2016 were both high and drop out of the y/y.
- Early guess at Median CPI, which I think is a better measure of inflation…my back of envelope is 0.24% m/m, 2.61% y/y…new high.
- CPI in 4 pieces. #1 Food & Energy (about 21%)
- CPI in 4 pieces. #2 Core Goods (about 20%)
- CPI in 4 pieces. #3 Core Services less Rent of Shelter (about 27%)
- CPI in 4 pieces. #4 Rent of Shelter (about 33%)
- This is why people are worried re’ inflation AND why people dismiss it. “It’s just housing.” Yeh, but that’s the persistent part.
- Scary part about rents is that it’s accelerating even above our model, and we have been among the more aggressive forecast.
- OK, that’s all for this morning. Anyone going to the Inside ETFs conference next week? Look me up.
We end 2016 with the outlook in limbo, at least looking at these charts – unless January and February print 0.3% on core inflation, core CPI will be hanging around 2% for at least the next few months. Median inflation is more worrisome, as it will probably hit a new high when it is reported later today, but it doesn’t get the ink that core CPI or core PCE gets.
To my mind, the underlying trends are still very supportive of a cyclical (secular??) upswing in core inflation. Here’s a summary of two of the pieces that people care about a lot. Housing is much bigger, but slower; Medical Care is more responsive, but smaller.
I suspect that chart is enough to keep most consumers jittery with respect to inflation, but as long as retail gasoline prices stay below $3/gallon there won’t be much of an outcry. But that doesn’t matter. M2 money growth accelerated throughout 2016 as the economy improved, and ended the year at 7.6% y/y. Interest rates are rising, which will help push money velocity higher. It’s hard to see how that turns into a disinflationary outcome.
I was planning to write an article today about the shape of the yield curve. Since the Global Financial Crisis, the Treasury curve has been very steep – in early 2010 the 2y/10y spread reached almost 300bps, which is not only unprecedented in absolute terms but especially in relative terms: a 300bp spread when 2-year yields are below 1% is much more significant than a 300bp spread when 2-year yields are at 10%.
But what I had planned to write about was the phenomenon – well-known when I was a cub interest-rate strategist – that the yield curve steepens in rallies and flattens in selloffs. The chart below shows this tendency. The 5-year yield is on the left axis and inverted high-to-low. The 2y/10y spread is on the right axis. Note that there is substantial co-movement for the recession of the early 1990s, throughout the ensuing expansion (albeit with a general drift to lower yields), in the recession of the early 2000s, the ensuing expansion, and the lead-up to the GFC.
I was ready to point out that the steepening and flattening trends tend to be steady, and I was going to illustrate that they feed on themselves partly for this technical reason: that when the curve is steep, steepening trades (selling 10-year notes and buying duration-weighted 2-year notes, financing both in repo) tend to be positive carry and therefore easier to maintain, while on the other hand when the curve is flat the opposite tends to be true. So the actual causality of the relationship between steepening and rallies is more complex than it seems at first blush.
It would have made a very good article, but then I noticed that since 2010 or so the tendency has in fact reversed!
Specifically, from 1987-1995 the correlation of the level of the 5-year spread to the level of the 2s/10s spread was -0.78. From 1995-1999, the correlation flipped to +0.48 (but I didn’t bother to de-trend the data and I suspect that correlation stems more from the strong, 350bp decline in interest rates from 1995-1999). From 1999-2009, the correlation was -0.81. Since 2010, the correlation is +0.60: the curve has tended to flatten in rallies and steepen in selloffs. And, in the recent bond market selloff, the curve steepened as long rates rose further than short rates.
This is interesting. Clearly, carry dynamics cannot explain why the relationship is inverted. I think the answer, though, is this: since 2010, the overnight has been anchored. That isn’t different than in the past – from late 1992 to early 1994, the Fed funds target was anchored at 3%. But the difference is that back then, traders acted as if the Fed might eventually move the overnight rate in a meaningful way. Since 2010, investors and traders have attributed no credibility to the Fed, with virtually no chance of a substantial move over a short period of time. Accordingly, while short interest rates historically have tended to be the tail wagging the dog, while longer-term interest rates move around less as investors assume the Fed will remain ahead of the curve and keep longer-term inflation and interest rates in a reasonable range…in the current case, short term rates don’t move while longer-term rates reflect the market belief that rates will eventually reach an equilibrium but over a much longer period than 2 years as the Federal Reserve is dragged kicking and screaming.
I happen to agree, but it isn’t a great sign. I suppose it was destined, in a way – “open mouth” operations can only work in the long run if the Fed is credible, and the Fed can only be credible in the long run if it delivers on its promises. But it hasn’t. This is probably because the Fed’s forecast have been worse than abysmal, meaning its promises were based on bad forecasts. In such a case, changing one’s mind when the data changes is the right thing to do. But even more important, if your forecasts are frequently wrong, is to shut up and stop trying to move markets where you want them with “open mouth” operations. I have said it for 20 years: the worst thing Greenspan ever did was to make “transparency” a goal of the Fed. They’re just not good enough at what they do to make their activities transparent…at least, if they want to maintain credibility.
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Administrative Note: On Monday I will be conducting the third and final in a series of webinars on inflation and inflation investing. This series will be done on the Shindig platform, sponsored by Enduring Investments, in cooperation with Investing.com. This webinar is on “Inflation-Aware Investing.” You can sign up directly with Shindig here, or find the webinar link at Investing.com.
One of the problems that inflation folks have is that the historical data series for many of the assets we use in our craft are fairly short, low-quality, or difficult to obtain. Anything in real estate is difficult: farmland, timber, commercial real estate. Even many commodities futures only go back to the early 1980s. But the really frustrating absence is the lack of a good history of real interest rates (interest rates on inflation-linked bonds). The UK has had inflation-linked bonds since the early 1980s, but the US didn’t launch TIPS until 1997 and most other issuers of ILBs started well after that.
This isn’t just a problem for asset-allocation studies, although it is that. The lack of a good history of real interest rates is problematic to economists and financial theoreticians as well. These practitioners have been forced to use sub-optimal “solutions” instead. One popular method of creating a past history of “real interest rates” is to use a nominal interest rate and adjust it by current inflation. This is obvious nonsense. A 10-year nominal interest rate consists of 10-year real interest rates and 10-year forward inflation expectations. The assumption – usually explicit in studies of this kind – is that “investors assume the next ten years of inflation will be the same as the most-recent year’s inflation.”
We now have plenty of data to prove that isn’t how expectations work – and, not to mention, a complete curve of real interest rates given by TIPS yields – but it is still a popular way for lazy economists to talk about real rates. Here is what the historical record looks like if you take 10-year Treasury rates and deflate them by trailing 1-year inflation:
This is ridiculously implausible volatility for 10-year real rates, and a range that is unreasonable. Sure, nominal rates were very high in the early 1980s, but 10%? And can it be that real rates – the cost of 10-year money, adjusted for forward inflation expectations – were -4.6% in 1980 and +9.6% in 1984? This hypothetical history is clearly so unlikely as to be useless.
In 2000, Jay Shanken and S.P. Kothari wrote a paper called “Asset Allocation with Conventional and Indexed Bonds.” To make this paper possible, they had to back-fill returns from hypothetical inflation-linked bonds. Their method was better than the method mentioned above, but still produced an unreasonably volatile stream. The chart below shows a series, in red, that is derived from their series of hypothetical annual real returns on 5-year inflation-indexed bonds, and backing into the real yields implied by those returns. I have narrowed the historical range to focus better on the range of dates in the Shanken/Kothari paper.
You can see the volatility of the real yield series is much more reasonable, but still produces a very high spike in the early 1980s.
The key to deriving a smarter real yield series lies in this spike in the early 1980s. We need to understand that what drives very high nominal yields, such as we had at that time in the world, is not real yields. Since the real yield is essentially the real cost of money it should not ever be much higher than real potential economic growth. Very high nominal yields are, rather, driven by high inflation expectations. If we look at the UK experience, we can see from bona fide inflation-linked bonds that in the early 1980s real yields were not 10%, but actually under 5% despite those very high nominal yields. Conversely, very low interest rates tend to be caused by very pessimistic real growth outcomes, while inflation expectations behave as if there is some kind of floor.
We at Enduring Investments developed some time ago a model that describes realistically how real yields evolve given nominal yields. We discovered that this model fits not only the UK experience, but every developed country that has inflation-linked bonds. Moreover, it accurately predicted how real yields would behave when nominal yields fell below 2% as they did in 2012…even though yields like that were entirely out-of-sample when we developed the model. I can’t describe the model in great detail because the method is proprietary and is used in some of our investment approaches. But here is a chart of the Enduring Investments real yield series, with the “classic” series in blue and the “Shanken/Kothari” series in red:
This series has a much more reasonable relationship to the interest rate cycle and to nominal interest rates specifically. Incidentally, when I sat down to write this article I hadn’t ever looked at our series calculated that far back before, and hadn’t noticed that it actually fits a sine curve very well. Here is the same series, with a sine wave overlaid. (The wave has a frequency of 38 years and an amplitude of 2.9% – I mention this for the cycle theorists.)
This briefly excited me, but I stress briefly. It’s interesting but merely coincidental. When we extend this back to 1871 (using Shiller data) there is still a cycle but the amplitude is different.
So what is the implication of this chart? There is nothing predictive here; about all that we can (reasonably) say is what we already knew: real yields are not just low, but historically low. (Current 10-year TIPS yields are higher than our model expects them to be, but not by as much as they were earlier this year thanks to a furious rally in breakevens.) Money is historically cheap – again, we knew this – in a way it hasn’t been since the War effort when nominal interest rates were fixed by the Fed even though wartime inflation caused expectations to rise. With real yields that low, how did the war effort get funded? Who in the world lent money at negative real interest rates like banks awash in cash do today?
It hasn’t happened yet, but it is about to.
Not since just before the financial crisis has the expected 10-year real return from stocks been below the 10-year TIPS yield. But with TIPS selling off and stocks rallying, the numbers are virtually the same: both stocks, and TIPS, have an expected real return of about 0.70% per annum for the next 10 years.
A quick word about my method is appropriate because some analysts will consider this spread to already be negative. I use a method similar to that used by Arnott, Grantham, and other well-known ‘value’ investors: I add the dividend yield for equities to an estimate of long-run real economic growth, and then assume that cyclical multiples pull two-thirds of the way back to the long-run value, over ten years. (By comparison, Grantham assumes that multiples fully mean-revert, over seven years, so he will see stocks as even more expensive than I do – but the important point is that the method doesn’t change over time).
Somewhat trickier is the calculation of 10-year real yields before 1997, when TIPS were first issued. But we have a way to do that as well – a method much better than the old-fashioned approach of taking current ten-year yields and subtracting trailing 1-year inflation (used by many notables, including such names as Fama). That only matters because the chart I am about to show goes back to 1956, and so I know someone would ask where I got 10 year real yields prior to 1997.
The chart below (Source: Enduring Investments) shows the “real equity premium” – the expected real return of stocks, compared to the true risk-free asset at a 10-year horizon: 10-year TIPS.
The good news is that in this sense, stocks are not as expensive relatively as they were in the late 1990s, nor as expensive (although much closer) relatively as they were prior to the global financial crisis. Nor even as they were (although even closer) just prior to the 1987 stock market crash. Yay.
The bad news is that they are every bit as expensive as they were in early 1973, just before the ten-year bear market that was, in real terms, every bit as bad as the 2000-2009 bear market. From 1973 to mid-1982, stocks lost roughly 60% of their value in real terms – just about what they lost in real terms between 2000 and 2009. The chart below (Source: Bloomberg) shows the S&P 500 divided by CPI, on a log scale so you can see the similar percentage moves.
The parallels with 1999 don’t scare me. There isn’t the same exuberance over companies with no earnings and “new world” “new paradigm” chatterings. But the parallels with the late 1960s/early 1970s frighten me quite a bit more. The hippies are out protesting, and everything! The interest rate cycle in 1973 had already long-since bottomed, as had core inflation – although in 1972 and 1973 inflation had actually come back down from the Vietnam War-induced bump of the late 1960s. In 2016, we also face an interest rate cycle that has turned, and core inflation that bottomed more than six years ago. In 1973, a Republican President had just been (re-)elected and stocks rallied into the inauguration. And that, my friends, was that. Poor central bank policy – encouraged by a certain Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers named Alan Greenspan – ensured that even when stocks bottomed in nominal terms in 1974, they continued to lose value to accelerating inflationary dynamics.
I could go on, but these are merely my own qualms. The quantitative fact, and not the story, is what matters: stocks now no longer offer an expectation of return in excess of the risk-free return. They may keep rallying for years since the US dollar is the high-yielding currency and money needs to go somewhere, but we are into the realm of speculative finance. For a while, the argument for stocks was “sure, they’re expensive, but with yields this low they are still relatively better.” They’re no longer even relatively better.
 With the exception of Tesla.
**NOTE – please see the announcement at the end of this article, regarding a series of free webinars that begins next Monday.**
Whatever else the election of Donald Trump to be President of the United States has meant, it has meant a lot of excitement in precincts that worry about inflation. This is usually attributed, among the chattering classes, to the faster growth expected if Mr. Trump’s expressed preference for tax cuts and spending increases obtains. However, since growth doesn’t cause inflation that isn’t the part of a Trump Presidency that concerns me with respect to a continuing rise in inflation.
In our latest Quarterly Inflation Outlook, I wrote a short piece on the significance of the de-globalization movement for inflation. That is an area where, if the President-Elect delivers on his promises, a lot of damage could be done in the growth/inflation tradeoff. I have written before about how a big part of the reason for the generous growth/inflation tradeoff of the 1990s was the rapid globalization of many industries following the end of the Cold War. Deutsche Bank recently produced a research piece (I don’t recall whether it had anything to do with inflation, weirdly) that contained the following chart (Source: as cited).
This chart is the “smoking gun” that supports this version of events, in terms of why the inflation dynamic shifted in the early 1990s. Free trade helped to restrain prices in certain goods (apparel is a great example – prices are essentially unchanged over the last 25 years), by allowing the possibility of significant cost savings on production.
The flip side of a cost savings on production, though, is a loss of domestic manufacturing jobs; it is this loss that Mr. Trump took productive advantage of. If Mr. Trump moves to increase tariffs and other barriers to trade, and to reverse some of the globalization trend that has driven lower prices for the last quarter-century, it is potentially very negative news for inflation. While there was some evidence that the globalization dividend was beginning to get ‘tapped out’ as all of the low-hanging fruit had been harvested – and such a development would cause inflation to be higher than otherwise it would have been – I had not expected the possibility of a reversal of the globalization dividend except as a possible and minor side-effect of tensions with Russia over the Ukraine, or the effect the Syrian refugee problem could have on open borders. The election of Mr. Trump, however, creates the very real possibility that the reversal of this dividend might be a direct consequence of conscious policy choices.
I don’t think that’s the main reason that people are worried about inflation, though. Today, one contributor is the news that OPEC actually agreed to cut production, in January, and that some non-OPEC producers agreed to an additional cut. U.S. shale oil producers are clicking their heels in delight, because oil prices were already high enough that production was increasing again and they are more than happy to take more market share back. Oil prices are up about 15% since the announcement.
But that’s near-term, and I don’t expect the oil rally has legs much beyond current levels. Breakevens have been rallying, though, for weeks. Some of it isn’t related to Trump at all but to other initiatives. One correspondent of mine, who owns an office-cleaning business, sent me this note today:
“Think of you often lately as I’m on the front line out here of the “instant” 25% increase in min wage. Voters decided to move min wage out here from 8.05 to $10 jan 1. Anyone close to 10/hr is looking for a big raise. You want to talk about fast dollars, hand a janitor a 25% pay bump and watch the money move. Big inflation numbers pending from the southwest. I’m passing some through but market is understandably reacting slower than the legislation.”
Those increases will definitely increase measured inflation further, though by a lot less than it increases my friend’s costs. Again, it’s an arrow pointing the wrong way for inflation. And, really, there aren’t many pointing the right way. M2 growth continues to accelerate; it is now at 7.8% y/y. That is too fast for price stability, especially as rates rise.
All of these arrows add up to substantial moves in inflation breakevens. 10-year breaks are up 55bps since September and 30bps since the election. Ten-year inflation expectations as measured more accurately by inflation swaps are now at 2.33%. Almost all of that rise has been in expectations for core inflation. The oft-watched 5y5y forward inflation (which takes us away from that part of the curve which is most impacted by energy movements) is above 2.5% again and, while still below the “normal” 2.75%-3.25% range, is at 2-year highs (see Chart, source Bloomberg).
So what is an investor to do – other than to study, which there is an excellent opportunity to do for the next three Mondays with a series of educational webinars I am conducting (see details below)? There are a few good answers. At 0.46%, 10-year TIPS still represent a poor real return but a guaranteed positive 1/2% real return beats what is available from many risky assets right now. Commodities remain cheap, although less so. You can invest in a company that specializes in inflation, if you are an accredited investor: Enduring Investments is raising a small amount of money for the management company in a 506(c) offering and is still taking subscriptions. Unfortunately, it is difficult to own inflation expectations directly – and in any event, the easy money there has been made.
What you don’t want to do if you are worried about inflation is own stocks as a “hedge.” Multiples move inversely with inflation.
Unlike prior equity market rallies, I understand this one. It is plausible to me that a very business-friendly President, who cuts corporate and personal taxes and reduces regulatory burdens, might be good for corporate earnings and even for the economic growth rate (although the bad things coming on trade will blunt some of that). But before getting too ebullient about the potential for higher corporate earnings, consider this: if Trump is business-friendly, then surely the opposite must be said about President Obama who did essentially the reverse. But what happened to equities? They tripled over his eight years (perhaps they “only” doubled, depending on when you measure from). That’s because lower interest rates and the Fed’s removal of safe securities in search of a stimulus from the “portfolio balance channel” caused equity multiples to expand drastically. So, valuations went from low, to extremely high. Multiples matter a lot, and right now even if you think corporate earnings over the next four years might be stronger than over the last four you still have to confront the fact that multiples are more likely to move in reverse. In short: if stocks could triple under Obama, there is no reason on earth they can’t halve under a “business-friendly” President. That’s not a prediction. (But here is one: equities four years from now will be no more than 20% higher than they are now, and might well be lower.)
Also, remember Ronald Reagan? He who created the great bull market of the 1980s? Well, stocks rallied in the November he was elected, too. The S&P closed November 1980 at 140.52. Over the next 20 months, the index lost 24%. It wasn’t until almost 1983 before Reagan had a bull market on his hands.
An administrative announcement about upcoming (free!) webinars:
On consecutive Mondays spanning December 5, December 12, and December 19 at 11:00ET, I will be doing a series of one-hour educational seminars on inflation. The first is “How Inflation Works;” the second is “Inflation and Asset Classes;” and the third is “Inflation-aware Investing.” These webinars will also have live Q&A. After each session, a recording will be available on Investing.com.
Each of these webinars is financially sponsored by Enduring Investments.